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Abstract 
Many authors argue that an increasing number of companies choose to outsource their IT 
operations. It is an approach to obtain efficiency and access external resources. Further, 
outsourcing creates relationships, and since the outsourced operations not are internal is the 
question to what extent control is needed. The purpose of this thesis is to explore how IT 
outsourcing can be managed in order to enhance an understanding of how a company 
manages control and relationships with companies providing operations. We question how a 
company manage its IT outsourcing in terms of control and relationships, and how control 
and relationship cohere depending on the company’s management of IT outsourcing.  
In order to answer the purpose, we have studied how IT outsourcing is managed in AB SKF. 
How IT outsourcing is managed has further been studied from a supplier perspective, thus 
two supplier companies has been studied. This case study was accomplished by a qualitative 
method, in which interviews were used. The results were discussed in relation to the 
theoretical framework, and the relationships, between SKF and the two suppliers, were 
compared and discussed in the context of relationships and control. Our result and conclusion 
indicates what companies in similar situations should consider in order to manage IT 
outsourcing in terms of relationships and control. 
This thesis concludes that a relationship is essential in IT outsourcing, and there is to some 
extent a constant need to control the outsourced operations in order to manage IT outsourcing. 
Further, there is proven cohesion between management of control, and management of 
relationships. The need to control and to have a relationship within management of IT 
outsourcing also has shown cohesion with trust. The thesis further concludes that it is 
recommended to manage IT outsourcing with a combination of relationship and control, since 
these two factors compensate each other. Finally, the most important within management of 
IT outsourcing is concluded to be a balance between relationship and control. 
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1. Introduction 
This section presents a general introduction to the subject of outsourcing in the form of a 
background. In the end the area of this study is briefly discussed.  
Throughout the world companies has realised that delegating responsibility for services and 
manufacturing to external suppliers usually leads to increased efficiency and improvements 
(Bragg, 2006). As a result, outsourcing of services and manufacturing has become an 
increasingly common option for companies, where the goal usually is to make cost savings 
(Rognes, 2008) and to manage competition (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003). Nevertheless, 
other factors such as quality, access to knowledge (Power, Desouza & Bonifazi, 2006; 
O’Brien & Marakas, 2007) and the ability to release internal resources also exist (Rognes, 
2008). 
Power, Desouza and Bonifazi (2006) argue that the reasons for outsourcing have changed, 
from short-term strategies with emphasis on cost savings to strategic business strategies. In 
the financially motivated initiatives, the goal was to manage the lowest cost of production. 
The relationship between the organisation who wanted to outsource and the supplier that 
provided the outsourced operation has been mostly in one direction towards the supplier. The 
reason for this was the assumption that the supplier had less knowledge. Power, Desouza and 
Bonifazi (2006) states that within the current reasons for strategically motivated outsourcing 
is the focus to gain specialised expertise, knowledge, process and capabilities from an 
external party. By using these inputs, the organisation can improve operation effectiveness. 
Strategic outsourcing often involves a partnership between the organisation that outsources 
and the supplier, which can contribute to competitive advantages. (Power, Desouza & 
Bonifazi, 2006) 
It is today very common for companies to outsource any portion of Information Technology 
(IT), as a result of a growing range of suppliers providing external services, technology 
developments and an increasing pressure on companies to achieve a higher effectiveness. 
Another driving force of IT outsourcing is that companies have an increasingly complex IT 
infrastructure. IT outsourcing includes several different areas but can be divided into 
outsourcing concerning maintenance of systems and outsourcing regarding developing. 
(Rognes, 2008)  
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Outsourcing requires a transfer of resources and decision rights to the supplier (Power, 
Desouza & Bonifazi, 2006). However, the transfer is not without a transfer of knowledge. In 
order for companies to get access to knowledge is thus a relationship between the two parties 
required, which is the kind of relationship that further will be studied in the following thesis. 
With the increasing strategic approach to outsource IT, which is a kind of service outsourcing, 
it is interesting to study relationships and control within an IT outsourcing agreement. 
Outsourcing literature will be explored to further inspire, and to identify absence of literature 
regarding IT outsourcing relationships and control, before developing a more specified focus 
area for the thesis. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
This section outlines the theoretical framework consisting of four parts. The first two describe 
the motives, problems and risks associated with outsourcing, in a certain extent directed 
towards IT outsourcing. The other two parts, managing IT outsourcing relationships and 
managing control in IT outsourcing, focus entirely on IT outsourcing. Managing IT 
outsourcing relationships is based on two scientific articles, one that develops a conceptual 
framework, and one that creates a maturity model. While the last part, managing control in IT 
outsourcing is based on one scientific article that develops a previous model. 
2.1 Motives for Outsourcing 
An increasing number of companies choose to outsource parts of their business. Although the 
introduction states that today’s focus is on strategically motivated outsourcing, O’Brien and 
Marakas (2007) see cost savings as the primary motive. Further reasons for outsourcing are to 
improve efficiency, which can be done through external expertise that may have better 
resources and knowledge of how to get the work done better, cheaper and faster. The 
operations that do not belong to the core competencies should be outsourced according to 
Power, Desouza and Bonifazi (2006), in order release internal resources. This gives 
companies the opportunity to prioritise the core areas that are most beneficial for the company 
in the long run. (Power, Desouza & Bonifazi, 2006; O’Brien & Marakas, 2007) 
Some knowledge and quality provided by external parties cannot be accessed within the 
company, which indicates the importance of access to external resources. Both Power, 
Desouza and Bonifazi (2006), and O’Brien and Marakas (2007) argue that this access to 
expertise is important, because a company who spend all their resources on developing 
expertise, skills, and technology does not use its resources properly. (Power, Desouza & 
Bonifazi, 2006; O’Brien & Marakas, 2007) 
Concerning outsourcing of IT functions to skilled service suppliers is today, as previous 
mentioned, often a strategic approach. Lower unit price and avoiding investments are further 
arguments for IT outsourcing in addition to the general motives (Rognes, 2008). Besides 
aiming for better quality of services, O’Brien and Marakas (2007) as well as Rognes (2008) 
argue that a significant motive is to get access to modern technology, trends and flexibility. 
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2.2 Problems and Risks with Outsourcing 
The potential risks and disadvantages of outsourcing are not as highlighted as the advantages, 
nevertheless does outsourcing also have downsides. Piachaud (2005) believes that 
outsourcing is time consuming and requires devoted expertise to succeed in managing the 
desired outcome. Furthermore, the selection of supplier for the outsourced operation is 
certainly costly on the basis of effort, time and resources. In addition, it is also an ongoing 
challenge in selecting the right supplier on the most suitable terms (Kern, Willcocks & van 
Heck, 2002). New opportunities and unfulfilled expectations can also generate 
reconsideration of supplier (Freytag, Clarke & Evald, 2012).  
Despite appealing reasons for outsourcing services or manufacturing, Power, Desouza and 
Bonifazi (2006) argue that some companies are too eager in the outsourcing process, which 
can for example result in contracts that are more disastrous than profitable. Furthermore, 
Rognes (2008) mentions a risk that the degree of innovativeness and development can 
decrease with outsourcing. It can also turn out that the efficiency will not be as high as 
expected. Furthermore, additional activities and vague management commitment can result in 
expensive contracts (Rognes, 2008). Outsourcing can further result in loosed internal 
knowledge, and the contact with suppliers can take much time and resources (Rognes, 2008).  
Piachaud (2005) and Rognes (2008) consider the primary mistake, made by companies in the 
outsourcing decision, to be the handing over of all the responsibilities regarding the 
management of the operation to the supplier. They argue that the control over the outsourced 
operation can be lost, which creates a situation where the supplier manages the outsourcing 
relationship. Furthermore may companies lose prospect of the operation and partnership 
principles, because of poorly defined performance expectations and measurement criteria. 
(Piachaud, 2005; Rognes, 2008)  
Another problem can be the absence of a communication plan in which the purpose of the 
outsourcing initiative and milestones for the process is described as well as guidelines for 
communications. Not having a strategy plan for outsourcing agreement failures, which outline 
how to deal with the consequences and describes alternative options, can be a huge risk. 
Problems and risks easily arise as remarked when companies do not know how to manage the 
ongoing relationship. (Power, Desouza & Bonifazi, 2006) 
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Rognes (2008) moreover states that outsourced services should be integrated into the 
company’s internal organisation and operations, which means that the management of 
organisational relationships becomes very important. 
2.3 Managing IT Outsourcing Relationships 
Conceptual Framework 
By integrating IT outsourcing research with theoretical concepts from organisational theory, 
social exchange theory and relational contract theory, Kern and Willcocks (2000) has 
developed a conceptual framework for the understanding of the relationship in IT 
outsourcing. The framework defines some of the key characteristics in a relationship between 
the company that outsources and the supplier. Kern and Willcocks (2000) claim that social 
exchange theory, and relational contract theory illustrates the need for a contract to manage 
long-term interactions to maintain an ongoing relationship. Social exchange theory focuses on 
the interactions between the company that outsources and the supplier, as well as the 
associated behaviour. Kern and Willcocks (2000) argue that in an outsourcing agreement 
based on a contract, the social exchange will lead to a continuous relationship of mutual 
interactions. In their opinion regarding relational contract theory does the “integration of the 
legal, economic, and social dimensions in contracting presents unique insights into the 
contract likely to influence inter-organisational relations” (Kern & Willcocks, 2000, p.328). 
(Kern & Willcocks, 2000)  
The framework consists of three dimensions that characterise the outsourcing relationship: 
Context, contract, and structure 
The context consists of specific targets and expectations, concerning for example technical, 
financial and political issues, which are formulated in the contract. These objectives affect the 
success and quality of the relationship to a high degree. (Kern & Willcocks, 2000) 
Interactions 
Good contact is crucial for fulfilling the targets and expectations in the contract. The contact 
can further be divided into formal and informal. Hard facts like technical, legal or commercial 
data are formal, whereas personal, supportive or soft data are informal. With an ongoing 
exchange of information, the relationship will change from contractual to a collaboration in 
which both parties can fulfil their obligations and achieve increased flexibility, reduced 
uncertainty, and obtain satisfaction. Regular meaningful communication of knowledge 
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sharing will likely also lead to better trust, which in turn may result in improved 
communication of knowledge sharing. (Kern & Willcocks, 2000) 
Another element to a successful outsourcing relationship is cultural adaption, a process in 
which both parties should adapt their attitudes, rules, norms, knowledge and corporate 
strategies. The outsourcing vision also needs to be shared between the parties to ensure that 
the provided IT operations correspond to the ones being requested. Based on these arguments, 
a successful outsourcing relationship requires investments such as time, knowledge and 
resources from both parties. (Kern & Willcocks, 2000) 
Behavioural dimensions 
The context around the agreement will affect the behavioural dimensions, consisting of 
“commitment and trust, satisfaction and expectations, co-operation and conflict, and power 
and dependency” (Kern & Willcocks, 2000, p.331). 
Commitment and trust are mutually dependent and matures together. Furthermore is 
commitment an indication of seriousness regarding the effort and willingness to succeed with 
the agreement. Trust can be evaluated by looking at if mutual goals and objectives have been 
defined, the time frame for these and intervals for evaluation. On the other hand, the parties 
will also have particular goals specific to their interest, the outsourcing relationship as an 
outcome will be less intensive compared to trust within a company. When the experience of 
each other develops will also trust develop. (Kern & Willcocks, 2000) 
Fulfilment of expectations will lead to satisfaction, and to avoid misunderstandings 
concerning the expectations, a continuous communication of knowledge sharing is again the 
key factor. The trustworthiness of the supplier can further increase if the provided operation 
creates satisfaction. With satisfaction, the success of the relationship will also follow. (Kern & 
Willcocks, 2000) 
Cooperation is vital to the relationship. When both parties cooperate, unnecessary and 
provocative conflicts can be avoided and forgiven. Cooperation will also cause recognition of 
the other part’s behaviour so the response can be adapted. The cooperation depends of course 
on the context, however it is essential to avoid punishing non-cooperatives, as doing so will 
create hostility, affect social solidarity, satisfaction and trust. (Kern & Willcocks, 2000) 
Power is mostly a consequence of dependency in the relationship and can be seen in the 
influence one party have over the other. For instance in a total outsourcing agreement, the 
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supplier will possess the dominating power because of the dependency. Nevertheless, power 
does depend upon interests the parties have in the agreement. (Kern & Willcocks, 2000) 
A Three-stage Maturity Model 
Gottschalk and Solli-Sæther (2006) evolve a model for IT outsourcing relationships 
consisting of three maturity stages, see Figure 1, “Maturity model for IT outsourcing” and 
Figure 2, “Characteristics of each stage of maturity of IT outsourcing relationships” in 
Appendix A. The model based on outsourcing practices and organisational theories claims 
that the focus of a long-term IT outsourcing agreement will change as the relationship 
matures. Gottschalk and Solli-Sæther (2006) argue that companies that have an understanding 
of the stages will succeed with the agreement. (Gottschalk & Solli-Sæther, 2006) 
The three stages 
The cost stage is the first stage, and within this stage is the outsourcing driven by cost 
savings. When planned cost savings are obtained and transaction costs are acceptable, 
unwanted behaviour prevented by contract, and employed in both company’s works 
reasonably, the relationship are mature for the next stage. The second stage, the resource 
stage, is the focus on competitive advantages. The maturity in this stage is achieved when the 
company that outsources attain value through profitable utilisation of the suppliers’ resources 
and when the internal focus is on core competencies. The last stage is the partnership stage 
built on norms, alliance and mutual goals. Gottschalk and Solli-Sæther (2006) state that 
companies should aim at becoming partners in order to fully succeed with the outsourcing 
agreement. (Gottschalk & Solli-Sæther, 2006) 
2.4 Managing Control in IT Outsourcing 
Relationships built on IT outsourcing have shown increasing opportunities and risks 
concerning the operation. The high level of risk associated with an outsourcing relationship 
may be reduced by a management control system, and a developed trust within the 
relationship. Mainly built on a model by van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, Langfield-
Smith and Smith (2003) develop an understanding of management control systems and trust 
in outsourcing relationships. As mentioned in part 2.2 Problems and Risks with Outsourcing, 
outsourcing relationships may be risky, and can be an uncertain situation for both parties. The 
risks or uncertainty creates a complexity in an outsourcing agreement, which can make it 
difficult to create detailed contracts. In these complex outsourcing agreements, different 
control systems are used to reduce risks. (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003) 
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Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003) claim that control systems can consist of either formal 
control, or informal and social control, or even both. When control systems are categorised as 
formal, outcome control encompasses measurements, and monitoring of operations is used. 
Another formal control is behaviour controls, which include monitoring and indicating 
individuals’ behaviours through rules and standard operating procedures. In contrast, informal 
control systems cannot be directly designed and the control consists of more social aspects. 
These different control systems have been categorised as “formal versus informal controls, 
behaviour versus outcome controls” (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003, p. 283). An 
outsourcing relationship with the need for flexibility and adaptability is characterised by 
control that is of less formal. On the other hand, outsourcing relationships consisting of 
formal control systems allows for greater control and transparency. (Langfield-Smith & 
Smith, 2003) 
Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003) argue that trust in varying degrees is involved in almost 
every control system, and building trust may be a possible approach in order to strengthen a 
relationship. Trust is essential in the sense that it enables to reduce the possibility of any 
opportunistic behaviour. This reduction may be advantageous to provide a predictability of 
behaviour between the parties. Creating and developing trust in a relationship can be an 
ongoing process over time, since the parties have to learn and adapt to each other. This allows 
a relationship to be more sustainable, and to manage potential conflicts and interactions with 
regard to the parties’ interests. There are according to Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003) three 
definitions of trust in order to manage outsourcing, which are contractual trust, competence 
trust and goodwill trust. The contractual trust implies morality, and that the other party will 
fulfil the agreement. The higher degree of contractual trust, the less is the need of required 
information to reduce any opportunistic behaviour. Competence and ability is the basis of 
competence trust, where there is an expectation of performance by technically competence. 
Competence trust is further based on a partner’s ability to perform as agreed in the contract. 
Goodwill trust is in contrast related to integrity, responsibility, and the partner’s intention to 
perform as agreed. (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003) 
In the choice of governance structures within inter-firm relationships, transaction cost 
economics is used, according to Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003). This means that 
organisational forms or governance structures are efficiently chosen when the decision is due 
to transactional issues. Transaction cost economics imply that the most appropriate form of 
governance depends on aspects of transactions, for instance “the frequency of the transaction” 
   Theoretical Framework
9 
 
(Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003, p. 285), and “the uncertainty encompassed in those 
transactions” (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003, p. 285). Within Langfield-Smith and Smith’s 
(2003) developed model of control, transaction cost economies concepts and trust are 
integrated and three management control patterns are identified, the market based, the 
bureaucracy based, and the trust based pattern. These are of significance in outsourcing 
relationships. Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003) mean that the model allows an analysis of 
possible characteristics and environment of transactions, and also characteristic of the parties 
within a transaction, and finally what role trust has in order to achieve control. (Langfield-
Smith & Smith, 2003) 
The market based pattern is mainly based on market mechanisms, which dominates the 
relationship. Transactions that are characterised by a high level of both task programmability 
and measurability of output, and a high level of task repetition are related to the market based 
pattern. The quality of a supplier’s operations is directly related to market prices, and there is 
a high competition among suppliers for the contract. Detailed contracts are not required, since 
it is easy to select another supplier, due to the competition. Characteristics of the transaction 
environment within the market based pattern are low uncertainty with many available 
alternative suppliers. (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003) 
The bureaucracy based pattern is in contrast, related to transactions consisting of a high level 
of task programmability and output measurability, and the repetitiveness is low to medium. 
There is a relatively low uncertainty of the transaction environment within the bureaucracy 
based pattern, and the future is seen as quite predictable. Detailed contracts consisting of 
detailed rules of behaviour and rigid performance targets are characteristics of the control 
within the pattern, and used in order to monitor performance. In line with the pattern’s control 
system, high task programmability and high output measurability, behavioural and outcome 
controls are used in combination. In an early stage of a relationship is trust of importance, but 
generally is the bureaucracy based pattern associated with a limited role of trust. However, the 
quality of work is influenced by human knowledge and skills, which means that high levels of 
competence trust and contractual trust is of relevance. (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003) 
Contrary, the trust based pattern is different from the other two patterns in the sense of 
characteristics such as a low task programmability and low output measurability. The 
transactions have a low level of repetitiveness within the trust based pattern. The major 
mechanism in order to achieve control within this pattern is trust, since the environment 
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involves a high uncertainty and risk. The development over time through exchange of 
information and expectations is important within the trust based pattern, since the low task 
programmability. There is a lower emphasis of results, compared to the other two patterns. As 
operational activities cannot be measured with any certainty, Langfield-Smith and Smith 
(2003) argue that trust is necessary to achieve control. (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003)
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3. Focus Area for the Thesis 
In the following section the problem analysis is first presented, which introduces the purpose 
of the thesis. This in turn results in primarily two research questions. Further, the scope of 
thesis and conceptual definitions are clarified. 
3.1 Problem Analysis 
Based in the introduction, outsourcing is an increasingly phenomenon in today’s business 
operations. There are many proven advantages of outsourcing, which is viewed as a reason to 
why an increasing numbers of companies choose to outsource any part of their IT operation. 
Moreover, as pointed out in the theoretical framework, it exists outsourcing literature that 
describes problems and risks that may arise in the outsourcing and its relationships. A high 
risk of losing control and responsibility in an outsourcing relationship is considered to be an 
interesting area where empirical studies are unknown to us.  
The outsourcing literature to a large extent discusses advantages and disadvantages, as well as 
how the outsourcing works in terms of preparations and effects. This raises the question of 
how companies actually proceed during the outsourcing within the agreement. Concerning the 
expectations of cost reduction, improved quality and an enhanced focus on core competencies 
due to the outsourcing, it is interesting to investigate whether companies can manage these 
expectations. Furthermore, as an outsourcing agreement consists of two parties, it appears to 
be interesting to examine the importance of trust in an outsourcing relationship. This thesis 
questions how an outsourcing relationship works both in terms of relationship and control. 
With the increasing interest of companies to outsource IT it is furthermore interesting to study 
whether the relationships evolve into partnerships, and what the need of a relationship and 
control within it can be. Absence of empirical studies of outsourcing based on the perspective 
from companies that provides the outsourced services enables us to further ask ourselves 
whether partners in an outsourcing relationship have similar views on the relationship 
between them. 
3.2 Purpose 
The purpose is to explore how IT outsourcing can be managed in order to enhance an 
understanding of how a company manages control and relationships with companies 
providing operations. 
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3.3 Research Questions 
Two research questions will be used in order to answer the purpose of this thesis. Due to the 
extent of the first question, this question also consists of sub questions. 
1. How does a company manage its IT outsourcing in terms of control and relationships in an 
outsourcing agreement?   
 To enhance an optimal IT outsourcing, what is the need in terms of control versus 
relationship? 
 What are the risks of having an excessive level of control versus having an inadequate 
level of control? 
 If existent, what are the risks of having a very close relationship versus having a loose 
relationship? 
2. How do control and relationship cohere depending on the company’s management of IT 
outsourcing? 
3.4 Scope of Thesis 
It is important to acknowledge that the scope of this thesis has limitations. The focus in this 
thesis is limited to explore three international companies, all three are operating in 
Gothenburg, Sweden. There is a greater focus on one of the companies, since the other two 
companies are providing the outsourced services to this company. Within this thesis there are 
further limitations to explore the service outsourcing, more precisely IT outsourcing in the 
sense of management of relationships and control. The scope of thesis is determined by the 
theoretical framework. Due to limitations of the scope of thesis, its results cannot be 
generalized to other companies. 
3.5 Conceptual Definitions 
Control, clarifying the term 
The term control will be used, within the meaning of being able to influence and review the 
outsourced operation. 
Information Technology (IT) 
Information Technology, IT, “refers to the various hardware, software, networking, and data 
management components necessary for the system to operate” (O’Brien & Marakas, 2007, 
p.7), system in the meaning of information system (O’Brien & Marakas, 2007). 
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Distinction between IT and IS 
Information Technology, IT, and Information System, IS, are two distinct concepts, that are 
occasionally used interchangeably. While IT is defined above, IS are combinations of 
components and resources that “stores, retrieves, transforms, and disseminates information in 
an organization” (O’Brien & Marakas, 2007, p.4). An IS consequently uses a variety of IT. 
(O’Brien & Marakas, 2007) 
Management 
“The process of planning, organising and controlling resources and people in order to produce 
goods or provide services” (Burnes, 2004, p.601). 
Outsourcing 
Outsourcing “is the practice of seeking outside organisations to take over activities and 
services previously carried out within an organisation” (Burnes, 2004, p.602). 
Partnership 
Partnerships “are defined as purposive strategic relationships between independent firms who 
share compatible goals, strive for mutual benefit, and acknowledge a high level of mutual 
interdependence” (Mohr & Spekman, 1994, p.135). 
Relationship 
A relationship, defined by the authors, consists of two parties having a continuous exchange 
of business transactions with each other. The transactions include, besides requests and 
deliveries, communication of knowledge sharing, and an overall ongoing contact. 
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4. Methodology 
This section discusses the research method, the companies selected for the case study, settings 
of companies and the data collection. Finally, the credibility is presented, based on validity 
and reliability.   
4.1 Research Method 
Due to the complexity of control and relationships in IT outsourcing, the deductive case study 
is a decent approach. The fact that management also is closely related to business specific 
circumstances supports the chosen approach. On the basis that a deductive method is 
characterised by conclusions about a particular phenomenon, which is drawn from general 
principles and existing theories (Patel & Davidson, 2003), the case study will mainly focus on 
one company. In this way will the specific context, in terms of managing control and 
relationship, be the particular phenomenon in focus. The interest is in analysing one company 
and its relation with two suppliers, as management depends on the context and the context 
affects the control and relationship. On the basis of this relation, the research questions will 
therefore be answered by using a case study. 
The empirical data, collected by the case study, will be analysed with the theoretical 
framework as basis. The theoretical framework mostly consists of recent findings from 
previous research due to a modern and timely subject. The parts 2.3 Managing Outsourcing 
Relationships, and 2.4 Managing Control in Outsourcing in section 2. Theoretical Framework 
is based on three scientific articles. Since these articles are repeatedly referred to in the 
outsourcing literature, these articles are perceived as credible. Further, these articles are 
relevant to the study area, and provide a good basis for this thesis.        
4.2 Companies Selected for Case Study 
The purpose is to enhance an understanding in the field of research rather than define any 
general conclusions, thereof mainly one chosen company. However, more general 
conclusions can be drawn within the selected company and its outsourcing agreements with 
the studied suppliers. This thesis will further provide an understanding of IT outsourcing 
instead of a comparison. 
AB SKF (Svenska Kullagerfabriken AB) is the company of choice, and will henceforth be 
referred to as SKF. With approximately 46,000 employees around the world and a turnover of 
66,216 million (SEK) in 2011 (SKF webpage, 2012), it is a company of interest. SKF is 
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chosen because of the company’s magnitude and its long establishment. Above all, SKF is 
chosen because of the fact that 90-95 percent of the IT service is outsourced (CIO webpage, 
2012). SKF has outsourced IT since 2001 and the strategy has changed over the years 
(Tömmervik, 2012). As pointed out, SKF is a global company with a high proportion of IT 
outsourcing and should therefore have a well-established approach on the subject of control 
and relationship in this area. Since SKF outsources such a large part of its IT operation, it is 
especially interesting to study how SKF in particularly manage control and relationships in IT 
outsourcing. Further, SKF is chosen as case company since it is considered to provide 
practical examples within this area. 
This thesis will also seek the supplier perspective to get a broader view and to avoid getting 
only a one-sided perspective. Moreover, it is desirable to study the research questions from 
multiple attitudes. Two companies are chosen to represent the supplier perspective, as two 
companies were simply preferred to get a profound focus. These companies are selected due 
to their outsourcing history with SKF and their associated extensive commitments, and not 
least because SKF see these companies as more than suppliers, they are seen as partners. It is 
essential to get inputs from both sides in an outsourcing agreement because relationship is 
something that is created collectively. Furthermore it is also worthwhile to study how the 
control is perceived on both sides. Since motives for outsourcing, and associated benefits and 
risks affect the outsourcing agreement, it is naturally also interesting to study these areas. The 
two perspectives, SKF, and the suppliers, will then be compared and analysed with the 
theoretical framework. 
4.3 Settings 
SKF 
SKF is a ball bearing company, founded 1907 in Sweden and is today a world leading 
supplier of products and services within bearings, seals, mechatronics and lubrication 
systems. The global company is represented in more than 130 countries and has above 100 
manufacturing sites and operational sites. The SKF business is mainly divided into three 
divisions, Industrial, Service, and Automotive, each focusing on specific customer groups 
worldwide. The divisions are further in need of each other’s products, services and 
knowledge. SKF has the principles to give comparable suppliers equal opportunity and the 
company believes in mutual benefit based on mutual trust. Furthermore, the suppliers have 
the possibility to be integrated in the demand driven supply network and be a part of SKF’s 
growth. SKF points out that their suppliers are essential for the company, in order to create 
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development and success in customer value. Further information about SKF can be found in 
Appendix B.  (SKF webpage, 2012)  
The two selected outsourcing suppliers to SKF are anonymised in the thesis by reason of the 
requirement from SKF. These suppliers will be referred to as company X, and company Y, as 
substitutes for their real company names.     
Company X 
According to company X’s webpage, the company was founded in the late 1930s. Company 
X has over 10 000 outsourcing customers in various sizes within IT and is one of the biggest 
companies within the industry (Svensson, 2012; Johansson, 2012). Company X has since the 
twenty-first century outsourced to SKF, however the outsourcing proportion to SKF is not 
that big compared to their entire IT business (Svensson, 2012; Johansson, 2012). Company X 
was originally selected by SKF as an outsourcing partner mainly for two reasons, the 
company had global spread and had thus a local presence and was offering the best price 
(Knobbout, 2012). The outsourcing to company X consists of everything that has to do with 
IT operation, and involves both maintenance and development (Svensson, 2012; Johansson, 
2012). It is perhaps 500 people at company X working towards SKF (Nordensson, 2012). 
Company Y 
Company Y was established as a result of a merging between two companies, which was 
founded in the 1960s and the 1970s. Company Y has, with a global delivery capability, 
around one hundred outsourcing customers within IT. By considering the entire IT business, 
SKF is one of the top 50 customers to company Y. From the twenty-first century, company Y 
and SKF have an outsourcing relationship. The provided operation, which involves 
maintenance and development to SKF, consists of for instance consulting, undertaking 
projects and other types of commitments. (Company Y webpage, 2012; Nilsson, 2012; 
Eriksson, 2012)  
Company Y was in the first place selected as an outsourcing supplier by SKF because they 
provided a system and solution that SKF saw a need for, it has then continued with several 
projects due to competence. SKF has also had a long relation to companies that are now 
acquired by company Y. At company Y, it is around 5 people working towards SKF. 
(Nordensson, 2012) 
   Methodology 
17 
 
4.4 Data Collection 
Empirical material has to be collected, in order to perform a case study of how SKF managing 
control and relationships of IT outsourcing. Empirical material is collected from primary data, 
which either can be qualitative or quantitative. The primary data depends on which type of 
method that is the most appropriate for the research, in order to enhance an understanding of 
the purpose. (Backman, 1998) 
The primary data for this thesis is collected through a qualitative method. The feature of 
qualitative methods is verbal analysis, naturally through interviews (Backman, 1998). Since 
quantitative methods, on the other hand, consist of different kinds of numerical and statistical 
observations through surveys (Backman, 1998), it is not an appropriate method. Qualitative 
interviews aims to find and identify characteristics to generate an understanding (Patel & 
Davidson, 2003), which is an appropriate approach in order to perform the purpose of this 
thesis. Furthermore, qualitative interviews are an applicable approach in the research method 
of a deductive case study, where the interest is in one company’s managing of the outsourced 
operations.         
The interview material is going to be based on eight interviewed persons, four at SKF, and 
two at company X and company Y, respectively. By using this amount of interviewees, the 
thesis will have both a well-founded and profound focus. The interviewees will be able to 
access the questions at least two days before the interview, to get an idea of the content, and a 
chance to prepare. The interviews consist of 28 questions to SKF, and 25 questions to each 
supplier, see interview guide in Appendix C. It is essentially the same questions for everyone 
at SKF, while another set of questions are used for interviewing the suppliers. This is due to 
the purpose of generalizability within SKF, company X, and company Y. In addition, sub 
questions will also be asked. In order to achieve the purpose, the content in the interview 
guide is based on the research questions and the theoretical framework, and is about control 
and relationships within an IT outsourcing agreement. The interviews are estimated to 
maximum 60 minutes and will be recorded if allowed, for own usage only in order to reflect 
the interviews in the best way. The findings from the interviews will be presented in the result 
section, each company separately, and the structure will in a large extent follow the order of 
the interview guide. This structure in the result section is chosen in order to, as a reader, be 
able to get an overall view, clarity, and the opportunity to compare the responses from each 
company.  
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The respondents at SKF consist of Johan Tömmervik, Theo Knobbout, Gunnar Nordensson 
and Ann-Chatrine Karaveli, whom all work within Group IT, the internal IT division at SKF, 
and are selected due to their titles and responsibilities. Moreover, the respondents at SKF are 
selected since they possess expertise within the study area of this thesis. Johan Tömmervik is 
a chief information officer, CIO, at SKF. Theo Knobbout is Senior Sourcing Manager, as 
member of the Group IT sourcing unit, and has many tasks and roles within the IT 
outsourcing area and responsibility concerning IT outsourcing contracts. Gunnar Nordensson 
is an Area Manager for the application management and operations department, and has a 
responsibility within information management. Ann-Chatrine Karaveli is Finance Manager 
Controller at Group IT and has responsibilities, for instance, such as business plans, support 
and follow-up regarding projects and suppliers. The interviews with Tömmervik, Knobbout, 
and Karaveli were particularly discussed from a SKF perspective of company X, while the 
interview with Nordensson was particularly discussed from a SKF perspective of company Y. 
The names of the respondents from company X and company Y are, as the companies’ 
names, anonymised due to requirement from SKF, and will hence be referred to as Svensson, 
Johansson, Nilsson, and Eriksson. The two respondents Svensson and Johansson from 
company X have positions as Client Sale Executive and Sales Support Executive. This means 
that Svensson has the responsibility regarding sales towards SKF and Johansson’s focus is on 
business development as well as sales. At company Y, Nilsson is the Business Area Manager 
and has the responsibility for service management, and is also responsible for the business 
relation with SKF. Eriksson is a team leader at Company Y for the employees that work with 
SKF, project manager, and has a form of delivery responsibility. The respondents at company 
X, and company Y are, likewise the respondents at SKF, selected due to their titles, 
responsibilities, and expertise within the study area. 
4.5 Credibility 
As authors of the thesis, we consider a critical approach of the study to be of importance, in 
terms of validity and reliability, and due to the difficulties and problems that might arise 
during an empirical data collection. The critical approach should be consistent with awareness 
throughout the entire thesis, in order to reflect, interpret and evaluate the credibility, where 
there is a need of a good validity and reliability.    
Validity means that the authors examine what has been expressed to examine, both in the 
theoretical framework, the collection of empirical data, the discussion, and within the 
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conclusion (Patel & Davidson, 2003). Further, a good validity can be achieved if necessary 
concepts for the study area are described in the theoretical framework (Patel & Davidson, 
2003). This has been pursued by consciously creating cohesion in the thesis, in which the 
theoretical framework has been the basis for interview questions. The thesis has also 
examined the expressed purpose. Validity in the collection of data is linked to whether the 
researcher has succeeded in establishing a basis for a credible interpretation (Patel & 
Davidson, 2003). As the selected interviewees possess the needed information and have a 
good understanding of the research area, interviewing these people fulfils the criterion of 
credibility. Furthermore, there is awareness that this study consists of interviews based on 
people’s preferences, experiences and knowledge.  
Reliability implies the extent to which random influences of various kinds can be resisted, 
since the observed value contains both the true values and error values (Patel & Davidson, 
2003). There might be a risk that the interviewees may not provide an accurate picture of the 
reality, but rather distorted. It has however been experienced that the interviewees gave an 
accurate picture, and it has been attempted to avoid distorting by being open-minded during 
the interviews with supplementary questions and asking for examples. By thoughtful 
interview questions, the problem of respondents becoming directing is to a large extent 
avoided. To achieve a good reliability in the study, interviews have been held at a level so that 
both the interviewed person and the interviewers are able to understand the content and each 
other. In order to create a reliability in the authors’ assessment of the interview responses 
have the interviews, with permission, been recorded to create as correct interpretations as 
possible, while notes were taken by the interviewer who were not asking questions. Since 
seven out of eight interviews were conducted in Swedish, errors can occur when translating 
their response into English. The interview with Knobbout was the one in English. Due to this, 
there has been a high level of accuracy in order to create credibility.
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5. Result 
In this section, the empirical material is presented, which has been collected by interviews 
from SKF, company X, and company Y. The interview responses largely follow the order of 
the interview guide. The emphasis is on relationships and control in outsourcing agreements. 
5.1 SKF 
Motives for IT Outsourcing and Perceived Advantages 
In 2001 SKF had a total IT outsourcing, however Tömmervik does not know the reasons, 
since he simply has been the CIO for just over two years. Though, he imagines that one of the 
original motives was to refine the business. Another motive was probably to increase the 
transparency, in order to make it easier to define the costs and to see what people actually 
does. Knobbout on the other hand knows, as he was working at SKF during the time, that the 
biggest motivation in 2001 was flexibility, to be able to really adapt to developments in the 
market, industry and business. Financial drive was a side effect. Today, the motive is still a 
financial and flexible drive, even a bit more so, but he thinks that it is today much more about 
strategies and really being able to adapt, steer, and direct, which you cannot do with all the IT 
internally. In many areas can the services, which SKF is in need of, be provided from various 
different companies and hence can the suppliers be exposed for competition, says 
Tömmervik. Nordensson believes that as Tömmervik consider the justification for the 
outsourcing to be both motivated by cost savings and as a strategic approach. 
Nordensson considers that an advantage of outsourcing is to be able to focus on the core 
competence. Around 95 percent of the IT operation is outsourced, but IT is alone not a core 
competence for SKF. However, both Tömmervik and Knobbout think that the competence 
regarding ordering the operation that replaces internal IT operation is a core competence, in 
the sense of knowing that the ordered services are right, cost effective and fit the business. 
The internal division, which is responsible for setting the directions, strategies, requirements, 
making the evaluation, and steering of the suppliers, is a clear core competence. Tömmervik 
and Karaveli perceive the future market for IT outsourcing as generally predictable and stable, 
possibly the market will increase to some extent.  
Tömmervik claims that a consistent advantage when outsourcing is that SKF can make 
demands in another way. All the competence cannot be kept within a company, since it 
requires too large investments. When using outsourcing, SKF can also take advantage of the 
suppliers’ scale of economy. Tömmervik remark, “If you have a standard system that many 
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companies use then there are many suppliers who know that kind of solution, if unsatisfied 
you can choose to turn to another supplier relatively simple” (Translated by the authors).  
Perceived Problems and Risks 
Tömmervik and Nordensson point out that if a company outsources maintenance of systems 
and administration, which are uniquely designed for the company it is very difficult to move 
the operation somewhere else, as the competence is tied to individuals. It is also a risk that 
sensitive information can be revealed in is such a customised outsourcing. Another risk with 
outsourcing can be that a company sells or hands over business critical knowledge, which is 
needed to keep the company on track. Karaveli points out the risk of losing control over the 
operation and dependence towards the counterparty. 
Partners in General 
Tömmervik sees the difference between partner and supplier in following way, “being a 
partner means that you sometimes can help each other without it being regulated in the 
contract, because you are so connected. If you on the other hand only see the other company 
as a supplier then you usually do not do anything else except what is stated in the contract” 
(Translated by the authors). Tömmervik describes that SKF has gone from total outsourcing 
to one supplier, to successively selecting various partners so that offerings, competence, and 
costs, can be compared. SKF has several levels of suppliers, the first level of suppliers 
consists of 7 to 8 companies, which according to Tömmervik are seen as partners. Both 
company X and company Y are included in this first level. 
The outsourcing business is a complex interaction and SKF has in total several hundred 
suppliers, says Tömmervik. As soon as a contract expires, SKF will make an estimation of the 
market to see if the operation can be put under competition. The contract will be extended if 
there is no reason for adjusting the outsourcing operation. Tömmervik declares that the 
outsourcing contracts that SKF sign are between 3 to 5 years, the time depends on which 
investment is made. It costs a lot of money to change supplier, so depending on the cost for 
the operation and competence, the contract will either be on a short or long term. It is costly to 
transfer competence from one company to another, this is because the competence is tied to 
individuals. The transferring and build-up process of the competence in the new company 
often takes years, so once you enter a larger agreement you will likely continue with it.  
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Relationships and Control 
Formal versus Informal Contact 
Tömmervik and Nordensson think that the contact between SKF and company X, as well as 
the contact between SKF and company Y, is both formal and informal and it is a constant 
contact. It exist agreements, formal purchase orders and meetings etcetera, which means that a 
lot of what is done is formally. Nothing happens without any formal papers because it is a 
business relation. Nevertheless, the informal contact is also important, as it is a cooperation 
between humans. “Outsourcing is extremely much about building good relations among the 
people who are involved in the agreement on both sides” (Tömmervik, translated by the 
authors). Knobbout states that ”of course the contact will be more formal if there are 
problems, but the balance between formal and informal contact is almost correct because if 
over-formalising, you will not make any progress”.   
Contractual versus Collaboration 
Nordensson view the relation with company Y mostly as a collaboration. The relationship 
with company X is by Tömmervik seen as both contractual and as a collaboration. It is 
basically a contract, but to make it work everyday collaboration is a must. The better the 
collaboration is, the less necessary it is to refer to the contract. Karaveli views the relationship 
with company X as mainly contractual. She states, “It is about balancing the relationship at a 
moderate level, so you do not get too close and drift away from the contract, because the 
contract describes the privileges and obligations” (Translated by the authors). Knobbout, on 
the other hand, thinks it is more of a collaboration where you are trying to work together as a 
team, but when you are setting up a new environment, such as a new agreement, it naturally 
becomes more contractual as people need to gain insight in to it. 
Communication of Knowledge Sharing 
Knobbout, Karaveli, and Tömmervik consider that there is a regularity of the communication 
of knowledge sharing on all levels between SKF and company X. Meetings regarding service 
level agreements and contracts are all running according to a fix schedule, which is important 
to keep the communication of knowledge sharing running. The communication of knowledge 
sharing is mostly based on cooperation, meetings and agreements, but also through 
documents, emails and offers. Eye to eye contact also exists to some degree. Between SKF 
and company Y, it is also a regularity of the communication of knowledge sharing according 
to Nordensson. He believes that the responsibility regarding the delivery that company Y has 
becomes a formal communication of knowledge sharing, since it is based on a budget 
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framework. Tömmervik believes that language and culture are the main elements of 
uncertainty in communication of knowledge sharing. There is always an uncertainty in what 
you really mean when you have language and cultural differences, which are why these 
differences usually give rise to conflicts. Knobbout means that the uncertainty is mainly in the 
area of a supplier’s change. Company X is continuously changing and adapting to the 
environments, which sometimes makes it unclear what is happening, and to what extent it can 
influence SKF. 
Towards company Y, the communication of knowledge sharing is seen as good by 
Nordensson. Knobbout thinks that towards company X, it is also overall good because there 
are no real surprises. SKF and company X know from each other what the other part is doing 
and which directions they are attempting to go, but the communication of knowledge sharing 
is something you always have to work on. Tömmervik argues that if SKF all the time would 
have very sharp, formal, and business minded attitudes towards company X, this company 
would instead be viewed as a supplier rather than a partner. If SKF are not happy with a 
supplier, they change supplier, but a partnership is very integrated so the parties have to learn 
to collaborate. The core of a successful outsourcing is to establish a good relationship and 
collaboration. “Of course it happens that we disagree but we try to solve this without hitting 
each other in the head with the contract” (Tömmervik, translated by the authors).  
Contract Design and Associated Obligations 
Nordensson claims that it is SKF that has the overall responsibility and control in the 
relationship with company Y. SKF must have the ultimate responsibility so that everything 
works, but in the same time the outsourcing partner has a responsibility to accomplish what is 
agreed upon. In relationship with company X, Tömmervik, Karaveli, and Knobbout think that 
SKF has the most responsibility and control. Knobbout for that reason states that SKF are 
always chairman and secretary of all working commitments, and that is written in the 
contract, therefore SKF can stay in control and be assured that things are progressing. SKF 
has a responsibility to make sure that the orders are being delivered, to control the costs and 
quality and also make sure that regulation and policies are followed. 
Knobbout states that the contract in an agreement is very detailed, but there is still room for 
reasonable interpretation, not least because things keep on changing and the contract, which is 
written in English, will be analysed by several different nationalities. If you always can solve 
problems without running into court cases, which SKF never does, it is a good mix between 
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interpretation and details according to Knobbout. Karaveli experiences that the current 
contract with company X is very detailed and has more service level agreements than 
previously, which may not provide the cost savings that SKF strives towards, but provides far 
better security and stability in the relationship. She thinks it is important that the contract is a 
win-win-situation since it is a partnership. Tömmervik emphasise that a contract with a 
supplier is mostly a standard contract, while a contract with a partner is unique. SKF can say 
that during a number of years shall certain specific things happen but company X will decide 
when and how it will occur, for example a cost reduction. Nordensson believes that the 
contract with company Y provides a framework that he thinks is good. Tömmervik emphasise 
that in a partnership they attempt to solve problems with common sense. If SKF has a 
problem and the partner can fix it but to a higher cost than what is stated in the contract, it is 
reasonable to agree to the suggested solution. In the contract there is also very much related to 
how to end the agreement, there are guidelines for failures and for what happens if one partner 
fails to fulfil its obligation. Knobbout also declares that the overall purpose of the outsourcing 
is defined in the contract. 
The Need of a Relationship in an Outsourcing Agreement 
According to Knobbout is the need of a close relationship very important. He thinks the 
relationship is more or less team based, where parties are working toward the same targets 
and do not only follow their own targets. Tömmervik means that a good conscience is 
necessary in a relationship, and this cannot be agreed upon since it is something to be created. 
Nordensson believes that an active dialogue is essential in a relationship. 
Tömmervik thinks that having a too strong relationship with a partner is associated with risk. 
He means that difficulties and confusion arise in the relationship if the parties are not able to 
know their roles. Due to this, Tömmervik suggests that it is important to define who does 
what in the relationship. Karaveli believes that a too strong relationship may cause an 
excessive dependency. As the relationship becomes stronger, trust might also become 
stronger, which can cause the risk of not make follow-ups. Further, within a strong 
relationship it is important to make sure that you as a client are not too dominant in relations 
with the outsourcing partner. A too dominant situation is further considered negative, because 
this client may be the one who must pay for all development within the outsourcing firm, 
which will be expensive for the client. Moreover, Nordensson means that having a strong 
relationship can cause a loss of efficiency. Though, with the assumption of properly ethical 
behaviour it is not considered to be a disadvantage to have a strong relationship.  
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According to Tömmervik, it is on the other hand also a risk of having a too weak relationship 
with a partner, since a weak relationship is described as a client being too small. This means 
that the client does not have any significant effect on the supplier. Being a minor client in a 
weak relationship can result in a hard attitude from the supplier, who primarily intends to 
refer to payment. Tömmervik describes the situation as lack in collaboration, no common 
sense and no value of a good relationship. If the relationship is to weak, Knobbout believes 
that a party might start working towards own targets or define own goals, instead of mutual 
goals. The described situation is considered as risky, since the parties might end up at 
completely different destinations. A weak relationship might also according to Nordensson 
entail the risk of an insufficient responsibility taking of the delivery. If the relationship is 
weak in the sense that there is no contact at all, Karaveli means that the parties will lose 
control and the closeness between each other.  
Financial Gain through Outsourcing 
In the question whether SKF in its relationship to company X has achieved financial gain 
through cost reduction, access to external resources and partnership with mutual goals, both 
Tömmervik, Knobbout, and Karaveli experiences that financial gain has been achieved in all 
parts. Knobbout even states, “I am deeply convinced that we did. It is sometime hard to 
measure but as said, I am deeply convinced that we did that, and calculations that we make is 
really showing that”. Karaveli claims that both SKF and company X are winning on having a 
stable environment, and will gain money in a continued partnership. 
Nordensson experiences that SKF in its relationship to company Y has achieved financial 
gain in terms of access to external resources and a partnership with common goals. Company 
Y, described as an efficient company with good quality, but in comparison to suppliers in the 
global IT market, company Y is not relatively cheap. Nordensson therefore believes that a 
financial gain in terms of cost savings have not been fully achieved, instead the benefits of 
company Y are based on their ability to provide resources and knowledge, and a partnership 
built on trust. 
Evaluation of Relationships 
The relationship with company X is evaluated each year, which Tömmervik describes as 
supplier evaluations. In these evaluations, suppliers are classified, and how the relationship 
works and how it has been is evaluated. SKF are using service level agreements, in which the 
service levels and the achieved quality can be measured. Tömmervik means that it is possible 
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to achieve a better relationship if service levels are maintained. Since these service level 
agreements are used, Karaveli believes that the evaluation has a high degree of measurability. 
At the same time Tömmervik points out that not everything is measurable, however what is 
measurable partly determines if it works well. He also describes that with some partners, the 
delivery has been experienced as poor despite fulfilled service levels, for instance slow 
deliveries. In the case of not fulfilled service levels, the suppliers usually notice the situation 
and fix the problem quickly. Knobbout explains how the relationships are evaluated by the 
use of customer surveys, and internal user surveys to get inputs. The evaluation further 
consists of evaluate numbers of escalations, how many issues SKF needs to solve, and 
whether the financial targets is working well. What on the other hand is not measured is 
contractual changes, but Knobbout indicates that he keeps an eye on it. According to 
Knobbout, the number of contractual changes are relatively low, either depending on laziness, 
or that the contract actually is very good and do not require further adaptions. In contrast, 
Nordensson thinks that the evaluation of the relationship between SKF and company Y is 
poor. The measurability is low and no general metrics are used, the evaluation is rather made 
by assessments and by maintaining a good dialogue. 
Formal versus Informal Control 
The control of the outsourced operation to company X and its relationships, mostly is 
described as a formal control through auditing and budgeting for example, according to 
Tömmervik. However, informal control does also occur by verbal interactions. Knobbout’s 
opinion agrees that the control is both formal and informal. Karaveli believes that in the 
relationship between SKF and company X, control is mostly formal and will become more 
formal since the contract now is more detailed than before. Nordensson in comparison 
describes the control of the outsourced operation to company Y mostly as an informal control. 
Although, formal control is to some extent made by, for instance, control of bills and review 
time management.  
Trust in Outsourcing Relationships 
In the outsourcing relationship between SKF and company X, trust is considered as extremely 
important according to Tömmervik, Knobbout, and Karaveli. A good collaboration is 
essential, because it is not possible to have contractual agreements for everything. Tömmervik 
means that trust is too complex to agree upon, and trust is created by a good collaboration. 
The need of control decreases with a good and well working collaboration, but in a poor 
collaboration, the need of control will increase. He highlights that trust is created between 
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people, and not between companies. Tömmervik further considers that trust is both 
contractual, and of competencies and responsibilities. Karaveli shares this opinion, she also 
thinks that competence trust is of a huge importance since competence is required. On the 
other hand, Knobbout thinks that there is a competence trust, and a goodwill trust, where 
goodwill trust is linked to responsibility and that people can feel responsible. Knobbout 
further states, “the more control, the less trust is needed, and the other party should know to 
what extent control exist and what is controlled”. Also in SKF’s relationship to company Y, 
trust is considered to be of great importance, according to Nordensson. Further he believes 
that 70 percent of the trust is based on what has been completed within the historical 
relationship, and 30 percent is of contractual trust. 
Access to the other Party’s Assets 
Tömmervik means that the parties in an outsourcing relationship are not allowed to take 
advantage of the other company’s assets or industrial secrets, within the company. He further 
describes existing disclosure agreements, in which it is agreed how company secrets should 
be regulated. On the other hand, when SKF is facing a takeover of a company, SKF can make 
use of expertise from the company they are outsourcing to, which to some extent give the 
supplier insight into SKF’s secrets. 
On the other hand, Nordensson describes that in the outsourcing relationship between SKF 
and company Y, the partners are allowed to benefit from the other company’s assets. For 
instance, employees at company Y are allowed to use SKF’s equipment, and they have access 
to SKF’s systems, when working with the outsourced operations. 
The Need of Control in an Outsourcing Agreement 
Outsourcing agreements are according to Tömmervik very large and complex, which makes it 
very important to have a well working control and to define the control mechanisms in it. 
Depending on the relationship, the need of control increase or decrease but Tömmervik claims 
that a certain amount of control always is necessary. Karaveli states that the control is 
important in the sense of ensuring and measuring the systems’ stability so that expectations 
are met. Depending on the need of control, SKF monitor in varying degrees, and Tömmervik 
means that it is depending on trust to a partner. According to Knobbout, “SKF have a need to 
control things with a high level of visibility, and SKF makes a lot of financial controls since it 
has a high level of visibility and is demanded”. However, in Knobbout’s opinion, the level of 
financial controls is far too high. Furthermore, it is important to have control over what has 
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been delivered, and whether there is good quality. “To have control is essential, regardless of 
whether trust, a strong relationship and credibility do exist. Control should also be of the 
supplier’s interest, to be able to document what is well working. Within outsourcing is the 
need of control higher than in an internal department” (Nordensson, translated by the 
authors).    
Tömmervik believes that having too much control of the outsourced operation and its related 
relationship is associated to the level of trust. He claims that the lower level of trust, the 
higher will the level of control be. In the case of a low level of trust, there is a risk that a 
partner creates control through commanding how the work should be performed. 
Furthermore, Tömmervik considers that it is a failure to command a partner how the work 
should be performed, since the client will then both do the partner’s work, create a lower trust 
and a detailed control of the partner. A client is supposed to command what should be 
performed, and not how it should be performed. Knobbout means that too strong control 
provides a risk to loose one of the initial purposes of outsourcing, to have flexibility and 
dynamics. Further, there is a risk that a partner might get a feeling of limited movements, and 
movements and challenges are important for both people and organisations. Nordensson 
thinks that a disadvantage of having much control may be the risk that too many resources are 
used to perform the control, which creates inefficiencies. On the other hand, having too little 
control creates a risk of vague orders and specifications, which in turn leads to a risk that the 
client does not get exactly what was expected. If the control is very low, there is according to 
Karaveli a risk of losing the control of the processes, and what the other party actually is 
doing in the systems. While Knobbout highlights, “if there is no control at all, there is a risk 
that you start to follow your own targets, this will not be beneficial”. 
Problems and Changes over Time 
Conflicts, misunderstandings and problems exist to some extent in all types of relationships, 
according to Tömmervik, and such situations are solved by dialogue and common sense. 
Further, the involved can be instructed to find an improved climate for cooperation. Knobbout 
describes that SKF’s relationship with company X has changed over time. An acquisition 
within company X has changed the relationship to be stricter and less dynamic. In the 
relationship between SKF and company Y, very few problems and conflicts have occurred, 
says Nordensson. However, it has happened that an assignment not received the right skills, 
which may have been due to a misunderstanding. Such situation is resolved either by closing 
the assignment or by adding a more appropriate competence profile.    
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Success and Satisfaction 
Tömmervik believes that the outsourcing has had a positive effect on SKF’s success, since a 
cost reduction is achieved and one of the initial aims, to refine the business, has also been 
positive for the success. Efficiency improvements in systems and solutions are built with a 
good outsourcing partner, and Karaveli means that SKF have created a competitive advantage 
against competitors. Knobbout has no doubt that the outsourcing has been beneficial for the 
success of SKF, believing that without an outsourced IT operation, SKF would not be able to 
follow trends in market, in order to expand.  
Within the question of whether outsourcing has fulfilled what was expected, Tömmervik 
expresses that expectations is a difficult area, see figure 3 in Appendix A. According to 
Knobbout, SKF’s outsourcing has to a large extent satisfied the expectations. At the same 
time, it is mentioned that it is logical that expectations and results to some extent might differ 
from what was initial expected. Knobbout gives an example that the flexibility and the 
delivery speed from company X have not fully satisfied the expectations. Nordensson believes 
that the expectations of company Y have been satisfied overall. Knobbout finally states, “big 
companies like SKF cannot survive without outsourcing their IT”.  
5.2 Company X 
Motives for IT Outsourcing and Perceived Advantages 
Svensson thinks that the main motive of outsourcing is that large IT divisions in companies 
often becomes very rigid and have problems with the process of change. Thus it is easier to 
outsource, which also makes it easier to make demands. Another advantage is that 
outsourcing makes it easier to conduct a cost control, and over time reduce the costs. IT is not 
a core competence in these companies, it is a function to support, in the SKF case 
manufacturing of ball bearings. SKF’s IT department does not have the required resources in 
order to be up to date, according to Svensson. Johansson agrees upon this, suppliers like 
company X have IT as their core competence, and have knowledge that companies like SKF 
do not normally possess. If SKF would keep the entire IT operation internal, the company 
would be quite vulnerable if the wrong person quits, however with outsourcing it should 
usually not be a problem, since everything gets documented. The market for IT outsourcing is 
seen as a growing market, says Johansson. Svensson also mentions that the IT service 
becomes generally less expensive over time, and the competition increases. 
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Perceived Problems and Risks 
The control of the operation becomes less with outsourcing, competence disappears and there 
is a risk that the supplier is not available in sufficient places around the world, according to 
Svensson. Johansson believes that many companies are using outsourcing the wrong way. He 
thinks that many companies have a tendency to place people, who do not fit in anywhere else, 
in the IT department, and this causes problem.  The easiest way to solve this is to outsource 
everything that has to do with the problem, but this leads to a problem in the next stage. If 
problems arise, the company lack knowledge to know what they really have left out, and 
cannot handle the problems very well. He continues to argue that companies need to have 
strategies of where they are heading, and keep track of things before outsourcing. Companies 
need to make a smart outsourcing, hand over what is a typical operation, but still keep 
knowledge, be able to control the operation, and at the same time have the right interface 
towards the business. “The problem is that the knowledge of how to do a sensible outsourcing 
does not exist among many clients” (Johansson, translated by the authors). 
Relationship and Control between Company X and SKF 
Formal versus Informal Contact 
Svensson and Johansson agree that the contact between company X and SKF is both formal 
and informal, and it is on a daily basis. The formal contact mostly consist of formal meetings, 
as for example contract and operation meetings, while it also exist informal meetings, in the 
form of meetings without agendas and records. The informal contact occurs in many contexts, 
as in projects. Johansson also adds that they have clear governance structure concerning who 
should be in contact with whom, and how often.   
Contractual versus Collaboration 
Johansson view the relationship with SKF as both contractual as well as a collaboration, but 
mostly as contractual and he is a little critical, “it depends on what SKF wants to achieve, 
they argue that there is a collaboration but illustrate well that it is after all a client-supplier 
situation when they think that it will benefit SKF” (Translated by the authors). According to 
Svensson, when everything works normally as is should, the contract is not important, and 
most problems are solved without having the need to look deeply into the contract. Though, it 
happens that there are different views, and the contract will than be used for clarification. 
Both the interviewed persons mostly finds that SKF sees company X as a supplier rather than 
a partner. Svensson’s theory is that it has to do with the maturity of the organisation that 
outsources, whether SKF can work with another counterpart as a partner or only as suppliers. 
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Maybe company X handles this the wrong way, but he thinks that SKF definitely is not 
mature for a real partnership, or may not want to have a partnership. Johansson also believes 
that the approach depends on the person in question. Some believe they can achieve 
everything with the contract, others think they can achieve the same with relations. 
Communication of Knowledge Sharing 
The communication of knowledge sharing between company X and SKF continuously takes 
place at all levels. Svensson argues that it though exists more formal than informal 
communication of knowledge sharing. Johansson thinks that the communication of 
knowledge sharing could be better, unfortunately it is a little too much sporadic, because SKF 
is such a large company and it can be difficult to know what is happening in different places. 
Svensson thinks the communication of knowledge sharing out to the end user is poor, which 
is leading to an extremely high pressure on company X’s helpdesk when new services are 
delivered without the end user being informed. He also mentions one type of communication 
that is missing, which is that SKF do not know all the services that company X are offering. It 
partly depends on that company X is not good enough in communicating this, but it must also 
be an interest from SKF to absorb the information, which may not always be there. Johansson 
believes that the worst thing that could happen concerning the communication of knowledge 
sharing is that SKF would tell company X to change any type of system the day before it will 
occur, because SKF thinks this is easy. Since this had happened, it has been written down that 
this type of communication of request and demand must be improved. In doing so, the 
communication of knowledge sharing has become better, but SKF’s internal communications 
from the IT division to the rest of the business may still be far better, states Johansson. 
Contract Design and Associated Obligations 
Svensson and Johansson pretty much agree that company X has the responsibility and control 
of the outsourced operations in the relationship with SKF. According to Johansson, what is 
written in the contract is company X’s responsibility and they have the control to perform 
this. Attached to the contract and service level agreements there are financial penalties, which 
works like a framework. Without hesitation, both Svensson and Johansson answer that there 
is room for interpretation in the contract with SKF, at the same time as it is very detail. In the 
current contract is the services more described in detail than in previous contracts. Svensson 
clarifies that he thinks that the contract rather is clear than strict, it is clear described what 
should be delivered but not how. Johansson also thinks that it is for the better, because then 
you get more support in the contract. Regarding the services that company X delivers, the 
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infrastructure side is dominated by standardised services while the application side is mostly 
customised. Company X strives to get as many services as possible to be standardised, which 
will make it easier for the customer, because they can get the service faster than specific 
solutions and usually at a good price, says Johansson. 
The Need of a Relationship in an Outsourcing Agreement 
The need of a relationship is according to Svensson absolutely essential. The parties may have 
a very good contract, but despite that, it will not work if the relationship is poor. On the 
contrary, the contract can be very bad, but a very good relationship in such situation can make 
it work after all. The relationship is considered as everything in an outsourcing agreement, 
since outsourcing mainly is a business of people. Johansson argues that a relationship is very 
important, in order to discuss in what directions things are going. Furthermore, a relationship 
is of importance as an outsourcing agreement usually runs over a period of three to five years, 
and sometimes even longer, and within this is nothing constant. 
In the question whether there is any risk of having a too strong relationship, Svensson thinks 
that it could only be risky in the meaning of a strong controlling relationship. It would be 
negative, and would not work if SKF control how deliveries are made. On the other hand, in 
the meaning of a strong relationship based on strong cooperation there is no risk according to 
Svensson, since it is essential in order to make the outsourcing work. Johansson argues that 
there are no direct problems of having a strong relationship. However, this depends on how 
people act, he means that problems can arise if people create a too strong connection to a 
company where they do not work. He further expresses that a weak relationship can never be 
seen as favourable. There is a risk that it takes too long time for a supplier to get to know 
what will happen and this could in turn provide the risk of not being prepared in time.  
Financial Gain through Outsourcing 
Both Svensson and Johansson experience that SKF has certainly achieved significant cost 
savings to what they had before, as demonstrated by measurements. There is a convinced gain 
of access to external resources, according to both Svensson and Johansson, and it has 
obviously benefited SKF. Svensson also points out that SKF has gained access to resources 
that they would not be able to access as easily themselves. The extent to which SKF and 
company X has reached a partnership with common goals, there is different opinions between 
those interviewed. Svensson thinks that there is no partnership with common goals between 
company X and SKF, he argues “within IT, SKF has not had the ability to create partnerships 
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since they have a more client to supplier relationship” (Translated by the authors). While 
Johansson believes that there is a partnership with common goals concerning, for example, 
cost savings and what should be achieved. 
Evaluation of Relationships 
A continuous evaluation is done, according to Johansson, partly within the formal meetings 
that are held. The evaluation is in terms of how it works both in activities and in the 
relationship. Svensson describes that an evaluation also is made from company X’s own side, 
within a survey are various areas of outsourcing examined. Johansson means that daily verbal 
conversations are also a part of the evaluation.   
Trust in Outsourcing Relationships 
Both Svensson and Johansson state that trust is important. According to Svensson, the current 
trust is consisting of SKF’s belief that company X can manage to deliver a service. Trust is 
viewed as something that is obtained. In a long period of trouble-free and efficient services, 
the trust will become stronger. On the other hand, Johansson thinks that trust will not be 
equally important with a clear and distinct contract, and he therefore highlights the 
importance of a good contract and an awareness of the content. Furthermore, Johansson 
thinks that the trust can be seen as a contractual trust. 
Access to the other Party’s Assets 
Whether the parties in an outsourcing relationship are allowed to take advantage of the other 
company’s assets, the interviewees share a common view that SKF have access to company 
X’s assets. Though, Svensson describes that SKF does not have access to company X’s 
intellectual property, for instance the accumulated and specific knowledge that the company 
has. However, both the interviewees think that company X has not as much interest in taking 
part of SKF’s assets. 
The Need of Control in an Outsourcing Agreement 
Regarding the need of control, it is according to Svensson important “to have a benchmark for 
what is good, and to clearly decide what is good” (Translated by the authors). Both 
operational and objective performance measurements are used, and Svensson thinks it is done 
in a reasonably way. Johansson argues that the most important concerning the need of control 
in an outsourcing agreement is “to have control in order to get what is contracted and the 
promised quality” (Johansson, translated by the authors). Further he describes that 
measurements are made through service level agreements. 
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On the other hand, Svensson thinks that there may be a risk that it is not conveyed to 
individuals whether the situation is good or bad when the control is too little. Too much 
control however entails the risk that there will be a very detailed management and control, 
which makes it impossible to deliver in an optimal way. Johansson considers that having 
much control is not that risky as long as the contract and the performance indicators are 
clearly defined. Johansson believes that “the risk rather occurs if the agreement is poor, if 
there are different opinions about what the delivery would actually contain” (Johansson, 
translated by the authors). 
Problems and Changes over Time 
The relationship between company X and SKF has, according to both Svensson and 
Johansson, changed over time, since it was not that good at the beginning of the outsourcing. 
The relationship has improved and is now better. Johansson thinks that the current 
relationship with SKF is very good, but both declines and upturns in the relationship are 
described. Declines have a negative affect on the delivery to SKF, which influences the 
relationship in the same way. In the current situation, it is an upward going trend in the 
relationship between company X and SKF. 
Within a long relationship, both of those interviewed believe that it would be surprising if 
there had been no conflict. Svensson conveys that there have been conflicts during SKF’s 
outsourcing to company X, and those are mostly solved through negotiations. For instance 
may a conflict include that SKF would like to have more insight than is permitted, however 
the intellectual capital of company X is protected to some extent. Nowadays, there are 
contracts that defines how to handle a conflict situation, further can a discussion be an easy 
solution. 
Success and Satisfaction 
In the question whether the outsourcing to company X has provided success and competitive 
advantages for SKF, Svensson means that SKF has gain a major cost saving. According to 
Johansson, SKF has achieved control and financial advantages, which in turn have made SKF 
more successful, and it has gained them quality and values. Johansson believes that the 
outsourcing gives SKF an advantage to focus on core competencies. The respondents share 
the view that SKF is important for company X, since SKF is a good reference in other 
contexts and to create new business relations, especially since SKF as company is market-
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leading and a financially strong client. Due to this, SKF has been positive for the growth of 
company X. 
5.3 Company Y 
Motives for IT Outsourcing and Perceived Advantages 
Nilsson believes that the benefit of outsourcing to companies like company Y is that IT is a 
part of their core competence. Company Y provides operations that customers are looking for 
in order to get lower costs, and best practice. Eriksson means that company Y can staff based 
on their own situation, build projects as needed, and control the resources without the 
customer approving who will work with the project. Nilsson and Eriksson agree that the 
future IT outsourcing market is both stable and growing. Within the contracts, the main focus 
has changed slightly, from a distinct cost focus to placing a greater emphasis on flexibility, 
the end users, and the value creation. Nilsson indicates that there is a clear trend in recent 
years, from a competition perspective. The trend he is referring to is the need of economies of 
scale to be competitive, based on the market consolidates. 
Perceived Problems and Risks  
Nilsson believes that a risk with outsourcing can be that the expectation levels can be 
different, for that reason company Y and SKF are working a lot on matching the expectations.  
Nilsson believes that another risk is becoming to process oriented and, to some extent, 
segmented, “if focusing too much on the cost there is a risk of not being able to deliver the 
value that the end user expected” (Translated by the authors).  
Relationship and Control between Company Y and SKF 
Formal versus Informal Contact 
The contact between company Y and SKF is both formal and informal, according to Eriksson 
and Nilsson. Eriksson describes that they have formal meetings, as you should from a contract 
perspective, but also informal contact on almost a daily basis in the form of telephone calls 
and mail. Nilsson highlights that the informal contact is an important part in a knowledge 
intensive business as it is about humans and relationships. “The informal contact is like oil 
that keeps the machine going” (Eriksson, translated by the authors).  
Contractual versus Collaboration 
According to Nilsson, the relationship to SKF is more of a collaboration than contractual, but 
the contract is of course important to have in place. The form of cooperation and the relation 
is based on collaboration rather than contract. Company Y’s organisational culture provides a 
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very high degree of flexibility and can, because of that, make deviations and adaptions. 
Company Y has furthermore a desire to have a position with SKF where they are perceived as 
a partner and not only as a supplier, and work as an integrated part of the SKF operation. 
Communication of Knowledge Sharing 
The communication of knowledge sharing between company Y and SKF depends on the 
various delivery models and commitment, says Nilsson. There is both a lot of knowledge 
exchange between individuals and in the same time much structure communication, thus it 
exist both formal and informal communication of knowledge sharing. The communication of 
knowledge sharing is perceived as good and usually as constructive and solution-oriented, it is 
very seldom the partners seek support in the contract. Eriksson adds that company Y does not 
feel that SKF either reads the contract through thoroughly so in this way is the relation 
perceived as very good from the communication of knowledge sharing point of view. 
Contract Design and Associated Obligations 
There is unambiguousness between Nilsson and Eriksson that the responsibility and control of 
the outsourced operations in the relationship between company Y and SKF is shared. For 
what Eriksson is responsible for, SKF thus receive everything from weekly reports to monthly 
reports, and based on these steering documents, the resource planning and the activity 
planning are discussed together. Company Y has several different outsourcing contracts with 
SKF where some parts are very detailed with clear expectations of what company Y should 
deliver and at which service level, while other parts are given more room for interpretation. 
Company Y has a very large room for interpretation regarding in how the services will be 
delivered as long as they meet the demands and expectations that are defined in the contract. 
Nilsson explains that the services they deliver are both standardised and customised.  
Company Y has an underlying desire to standardise and optimise methods, processes, tools 
and resources, but then do they also have customisation to meet the specific requirements and 
needs. That the benefit and value in what is delivered is high in the end is seen as more 
important than keeping the cost low. 
The Need of a Relationship in an Outsourcing Agreement 
To have a relationship in an outsourcing agreement is essential to make it work, according to 
Nilsson and Eriksson. Further, Nilsson thinks that the need of a relationship is linked to 
responsibilities and roles. He describes that there is a governance structure in which the 
parties can meet at different levels depending on the companies’ obligations, roles and 
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responsibilities. Eriksson thinks that the agreement is based on a relationship, since he 
describes that there is always a verbal exchange. From a client perspective, Nilsson believes 
that “there is no advantage to have either a strong or weak relationship” (Nilsson, translated 
by the authors). Furthermore, he believes that it is important to find a good balance between a 
strong and a weak relationship. 
Financial Gain through Outsourcing 
Both of those interviewed experience that SKF has achieved cost savings, gained access to 
external resources, and a partnership with common goals by outsourcing to company Y. 
Nilsson points out that SKF has made significant cost savings by the outsourcing, and he 
ensures that the outcomes have been achieved. Other achieved outcomes can also be an 
increased flexibility or access to specific skills. 
Evaluation of Relationships 
There are continuous evaluations of the commitments that company Y has towards SKF, 
according to Nilsson. As for the evaluation of the relationship, there are established meetings 
when the parties meet and evaluate together. Thus, it is an active evaluation, but Nilsson 
thinks that this is something that could be improved together with SKF. Measurements within 
the evaluation are company Y’s possibility to compare the results against established goals.  
Eriksson describes how company Y make use of task forces if SKF would observe too many 
errors in comparison to what is expected.  
Trust in Outsourcing Relationships 
Nilsson states, “trust is an important and crucial factor in the outsourcing relationship between 
company Y and SKF” (Translated by the authors). He further indicates that company Y has an 
ambition to have a good partnership and to be integrated with SKF. Concerning trust in terms 
of manage a task, Eriksson explains that there is positive feedback from SKF towards 
company Y. The interviewees think that there are both formal and informal trust, which takes 
the form of both contractual, competence and goodwill trust. 
Access to the other Party’s Assets 
According to Nilsson, SKF is in the outsourcing relationship allowed to take part in company 
Y’s assets, SKF has full access within reasonable limits. Though, some of company Y’s assets 
are kept within the company, such as specified expertise. Nilsson believes that a reverse 
exchange also exists, that company Y can take part of SKF's assets and SKF have an openness 
to share information in different extents and contexts. 
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The Need of Control in an Outsourcing Agreement 
Eriksson considers that having control in an outsourcing agreement is important in order to 
control what will be delivered and to know what to do. It is of further importance to make 
sure that the operation moves in the right direction. Moreover, it is also indicated that a 
dialogue of what is controlled is essential. Control is also from an economic point of view 
needed since it is another company’s money that has to be managed properly. Furthermore, 
Nilsson highlights that it is crucial to have control in order for company Y to know the 
responsibility, which means that company Y needs to have its own control. Nilsson means 
that too little control may generate the risk of not being in the right position to deliver what is 
expected. Too much control can provides the risk of being too detailed or increasing the costs. 
Eriksson thinks that too much control carries the risk that there will be a poorer flexibility. 
Problems and Changes over Time 
A relationship is always changing over time, according to Nilsson, since people get to know 
each other better, or a change due to new people within the relationship. He states that “it is 
like an ongoing journey” (Translated by the authors), and as a result of this, SKF’s strategies 
has changed. The belief within company Y is that the relationship with SKF has always been 
good, it has always been evolving, where Nilsson thinks company Y has managed to respond 
to SKF’s needs in a good way. Furthermore, conflicts and problems are seen to occur in any 
relationship. By having a dialogue about potential conflicts and to be close to each other are 
two different ways to get conflicts resolved. Eriksson argues that it is important that both 
parties have clarity, and signalling early if something is experienced to be wrong. Such 
situations are according to Eriksson related to the existence of a good relationship and trust. 
Success and Satisfaction  
The interviewees share the opinion that the outsourcing to company Y has contributed to 
SKF’s success and advantages. Nilsson means that different results can be achieved through 
outsourcing, such as cost savings, access to competencies at the right time, and in different 
ways increase the quality, utility and a value. “In times when things are going well for SKF, 
and if they believe that there is a good market and when they have ambitions to grow, this 
will have a positive influence in the willingness to invest” (Nilsson, translated by the authors). 
Nilsson thinks that SKF’s long-term strategy promotes success and growth within company 
Y. Nilsson concludes by saying that “working with SKF is enjoyable, and through that is 
growth and success created in company Y” (Translated by the authors). 
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6. Discussion 
This section presents the discussion. The result from each company, as well as the 
relationship between SKF and company X, and the relationship between SKF and company Y 
is compared and discussed, with the theoretical framework. This is done in order to analyse 
the purpose of the thesis. 
A balanced relationship is essential 
The empirical result shows that a relationship is very important and essential, in order to make 
the ongoing outsourcing work, which indicates that a relationship is fundamental in an 
outsourcing agreement. It appears that there is a need for a relationship in order for each party 
to know its responsibilities. As raised in the theoretical framework, Gottschalk and Solli-
Sæther (2006) argue that companies should strive to become partners, due to this is the need 
for a relationship large in the sense of achieving a partnership. Since SKF describes its 
relationship as the parties are working towards same targets, it is considered, on the basis of 
Gottschalk and Solli-Sæther (2006), that the need for a relationship is important. Furthermore, 
there is a strong need to have a relationship, as there is empirical evidence from company Y 
that as long as the relationship is very good will the outsourcing work even if the contract is 
very poor. SKF indicates that outsourcing means to build good relations between the involved 
persons in the agreement. This considers to be related to Kern and Willcocks’ (2000) opinion 
that cooperation is important in a relationship. Empirical evidence from SKF indicates that it 
may be risky to have an excessive relationship, where evaluations may not be made, freedom 
and room for a party’s interpretations may be limited, and there may be a loss in efficiency. 
This contrasts that company X considers that it is not particularly risky to have a close 
relationship, as long as it is not a very close relationship in the sense of very controlling. This 
questions why SKF who outsource, and company X who performs the operations have 
different opinions regarding an excessive relationship. It may be because it is SKF’s 
operations that will be affected if the outsourcing, for example, not is effective. On the other 
hand, all case companies claim that a loose relationship bring risks, such as loosing control 
and lack in collaboration. Based on the previous, as a relationship is needed, companies 
should find the balance between strong and weak relationships to minimize these risks. 
Interaction between informal and formal exchange 
Arguing that a relationship is important is one thing, however also achieving this relationship 
is another thing. The cooperation affects the relationship, which further depends on the 
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overall contact and the communication of knowledge sharing between the two parties. 
Continuous communication of knowledge sharing is also required to change the relationship 
from contractual to a collaboration (Kern & Willcocks, 2000). Both the two suppliers, and 
SKF describe the communication of knowledge sharing as regular, and consisting of both 
formal and informal communication. Furthermore, the overall contact is thus perceived as 
formal and informal on a regular basis. It is interpreted that the good contact between SKF 
and the two suppliers is built on regular, and in particular informal contact within these 
relationships. 
It is clear that great emphasis is placed on the informal contact in order to maintain the 
agreement, which indicates that the communication of knowledge sharing is seen as 
cooperation built on common sense. All three case companies believe that just the 
communication of knowledge sharing and trust are among the most important parts in a 
successful relation. The fact that the informal communication of knowledge sharing is so 
important for the relationship does not appear to be well described in the outsourcing 
literature. Company Y argues, that they rarely seek support in the contract is a proof that the 
communication of knowledge sharing is good. It seems like if SKF would improve its internal 
communication of knowledge sharing, the relationships with the partners would also be 
improved. SKF argues, if the relationship with the two partners simply would be formal and 
business minded, the partners would instead been seen only as suppliers.  
Are the relationships contractual or collaborations? 
Although all the companies emphasise the importance of informal contact and informal 
communication of knowledge sharing, all of the interviewed do not see the relationship, 
between SKF and the two suppliers, as a collaboration. The relationship between SKF and 
company Y is mutually viewed mostly as a collaboration. SKF has mixed views of the 
relationship with company X, while company X view the relationship with SKF mostly as 
contractual. Due to the fact that all three case companies see the communication of knowledge 
sharing as a cooperation, and highlights the informal communication, it is quite surprising that 
not everyone view the relationships as collaborations. However, it feels naturally that the 
interviewed say that it to some extent is necessary to have a contractual relationship, since it 
is a business relation. Since both the client and supplier perspective mention the informal in 
such a large extent, it can though be believed that it would be more consistent to view the 
relationships as collaborations. This is based on the need for informal contact and 
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communication of knowledge sharing to build good relations, which appears to be vital in 
outsourcing.  
The described view does also depend on the responding person, and can partly be linked to 
whether company X and company Y experience that SKF sees them as a partner or not. 
Company Y experiences a collaboration and partnership with SKF, while company X 
experiences more of a contractual approach with a client-supplier relationship. However, 
company Y is aiming to be a partner to SKF, and experiences in many contexts that they are 
also seen as one. While company X mostly finds that SKF sees them as a supplier rather than 
a partner. One mentioned theory for these experiences, which company X has, is that SKF is 
not mature for a partnership. However, the three-stage maturity model developed by 
Gottschalk and Solli-Sæther (2006) argues that it is not about one of the parties’ maturity but 
rather about the maturity of the relationship between both parties, a mutual maturity. 
Nevertheless, SKF’s original motives for outsourcing do not precisely match the first stage in 
the model. In this way may not SKF be mature at the basic level, SKF maybe not wants to 
admit the cost justification, and thus lack an understanding of the stages. Based on the 
empirical result, it is likewise not clear whether company X really wants to be a partner. The 
fact that company X sees itself as a supplier may be because company X means that SKF is 
not a major customer compared to their entire IT business. On the other hand, SKF is a major 
customer to company Y, in relation to their entire IT business. This may be another reason 
why company Y sees itself as a partner. 
SKF means that there is a clear difference between a partner and a supplier. With a partner, 
the relationship be can extended beyond the contract. So, it is interpreted that a partnership 
has a collaboration, which SKF also claims to be important to make everything work. It is 
then strange that both company X and company Y is viewed as partners, since the relationship 
with company X mostly is contractual instead of a collaboration. 
Cooperation with trust will reduce uncertainty 
As previously mentioned, all case companies believe that the communication of knowledge 
sharing and trust is essential in a successful relation. Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003) argue 
that building trust is a possible approach to strengthen a relationship. That is why a 
partnership with collaboration, and with a perceived higher level of trust is preferred rather 
than a client-supplier contractual relation. This is related to SKF’s opinion that a collaboration 
is vital, since it is not possible to have contractual agreements for everything, and that a good 
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collaboration creates trust. Kern and Willcocks (2000) mention the need of collaboration in a 
relationship in order to avoid conflicts and to get to know each other. A good collaboration 
with trust is considered to reduce the uncertainty in the communication of knowledge sharing. 
As SKF mentions the uncertainty of a supplier’s change due to the environment, it is a good 
reason to improve the collaboration with the partners, and in this case especially with 
company X. 
It can be seen that it is more important to have a collaboration, to be able to succeed with the 
agreement and relationship, than label the relationship as a partnership. It can moreover be 
perceived as a collaboration can be enforced, because with an integrated partnership can it be 
difficult to change supplier, which will result in a continued relationship. Whether a 
collaboration is as a side effect or a motive for outsourcing, company X argues that the easiest 
way for many companies to solve internal issues is to outsource the problem area. That is in 
consistent to Power, Desouza and Bonifazi (2006), which mean that some companies are too 
eager in the beginning of the outsourcing process. This may result in an internal lack of 
knowledge, according to company X. Company Y perceives that different expectation levels 
concerning the outsourced operations can be a problem, and they work together with SKF to 
improve these kinds of problems. Conflicts, misunderstandings and problems to some degree 
exist, but all the case companies mean that it is normal in all types of relationships. Kern and 
Willcocks (2000) point out that continuous communication of knowledge sharing is important 
in order to avoid conflicts and misunderstandings concerning the expectations, which the 
result also indicates. Kern and Willcocks (2000) further argue that cooperation in a 
relationship is important, which also is in line with SKF’s opinion that cooperation is needed 
every day to make it work. 
Access to each other’s assets, not always of interest 
Although the ongoing exchange and contact between SKF and the suppliers, different views 
exists regarding the access to the other party’s assets. There are different opinions, within 
SKF, regarding whether a party in an outsourcing agreement may have access to the other 
party’s assets. These different opinions may to some extent probably depend on that the issue 
could have been interpreted differently. As SKF means that the other party may not take part 
of SKF’s assets can be discussed. Since SKF sees its outsourcing parties as partners, the 
question is if a partnership not should result in a major access to each other’s assets. On the 
other hand, there is also a view within SKF that the parties may have access to SKF’s assets, 
in the sense of equipment to perform the work. Company X means that there is no interest, 
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from their side, in taking part of SKF’s assets, this may be due to that company X only view 
itself as a supplier. Another reason could be the fact that IT is company X’s core competence, 
which means that company X has more expertise within IT than SKF. On the other hand, 
company Y considers that the parties within an outsourcing agreement have access to each 
other’s assets within reasonable limits. This indicates a higher degree of cooperation and 
considers to be related to that company Y sees itself as a partner. 
Flexibility and stage of maturity 
Based on the interviews at SKF, it appears that the company’s outsourcing approach has 
changed, from outsourcing to only one supplier to several hundred due to the flexibility, and 
also the dependency and possibility to expose suppliers for competition. A consequence of 
dependency is power (Kern & Willcocks, 2000), which SKF of course wants to manage in 
order to make demands. However, the ability to expose the suppliers for competition is not as 
highlighted as, for instance, cost savings in the outsourcing literature. Regarding the 
flexibility, which was the main motive for SKF to outsource, is in contrast to O’Brien and 
Marakas (2007) argued main motive cost savings. It can thus be said that SKF’s justification 
for outsourcing today is motivated both by cost savings, and as a strategic approach, a 
strategic approach in the sense of efficiency, quality and competence as mentioned in the 
theoretical framework.  
All the case companies conclude that the outsourcing has had a positive effect on SKF’s 
success. As Power, Desouza and Bonifazi (2006) point out that it is a strategic approach to 
outsource the operations that not are parts of the core competencies, and SKF has by doing 
this gained flexibility. Although SKF argues that the cost reduction was a side effect in the 
original motives for outsourcing, it is admitted that SKF has achieved financial gain through 
cost reduction. The achieved cost reduction as SKF has experienced in the relationship with 
company X interprets furthermore that SKF has gained operational efficiency.  
Hence it is considered that SKF in the relationship with company X has achieved the first 
stage of maturity, which Gottschalk and Solli-Sæther (2006) has labelled as the cost stage in 
their maturity model. In contrast, it is interesting that SKF do not experience the same cost 
reduction in the relationship with the company Y. This may be due to that company Y rather 
wants to deliver high value than low prices. However, regarding the second stage, the 
resource stage (Gottschalk & Solli-Sæther, 2006), SKF experience access to external 
resources with both company X and company Y, and the internal focus is on core 
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competencies. For this reason is the maturity in the second stage reached (Gottschalk & Solli-
Sæther, 2006). Furthermore, SKF also experience a high level of social exchange, and a 
partnership with common goals with both company X and company Y. However, the 
benchmark variables, profit sharing and co-developing business processes, in the maturity 
model do not seem to be completely attained to reach the third stage. By looking at the 
maturity model (Gottschalk & Solli-Sæther, 2006), it can be argued that the outsourcing 
relationships have reached half-way into the third and final maturity stage. This without even 
fully experience the first stage with company Y. This questions Gottschalk and Solli-Sæther’s 
(2006) theory of the three maturity stages, because the empirical evidence indicates that a 
partnership can be achieved before reaching the partnership stage and without a complete cost 
reduction. Although, company Y argue that SKF has achieved a cost reduction. Furthermore, 
by comparing the maturity model with SKF’s outsourcing relation to company X and 
company Y, it can be argued that the relationships initially began in the second stage, the 
resource stage. Successively, the relations have reached maturity in both the second and first 
stage.  
How SKF creates control 
Even though the maturity, between SKF and both the suppliers, in the first, second, and half 
of the third stage is attained, the result shows that a good relationship is not enough in order to 
manage the outsourced operation. Control is of great importance, in addition to the need of a 
relationship, in an outsourcing agreement. SKF argues that both formal and informal controls 
are performed of the outsourced operations, which are in accordance with Langfield-Smith 
and Smith’s (2003) consideration that the control can be of both kinds. That SKF’s 
outsourced operation has a high measurability, and that SKF measures the qualities 
correspond to the way Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003) partly describes formal control, that 
outcome control encompasses measurements and performance measurements are used. 
Furthermore, Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003) mean that informal control cannot be directly 
designed, but instead consists of more social aspects, which also is consistent with SKF’s 
description of daily interaction and dialogue. It also appears that a certain type of control can 
be created by a relationship with good informal contact and communication of knowledge 
sharing, which exists in a partnership, in terms of a collaboration. As SKF believes that 
control is important since outsourcing agreements are considered complex, this shows that 
SKF is aware of the outsourcing process. Thus it is further interpreted that SKF thereby 
reducing the risk, which Piachaud (2005) and Rognes (2008) consider to be one of the 
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biggest, to lose control over the outsourced operations by handing over all responsibilities to 
the supplier. As SKF mostly believe that the responsibility for the outsourced operations 
largely is on SKF, it is seen as the risk further is minimized. 
A varying degree of control will always be needed 
As SKF argues that the need of control increases or decreases depending on the relationship 
indicates that control is always needed in an outsourcing agreement. The empirical result also 
indicates that controls are necessary in the sense of measuring whether expectations are met, 
and so that each party can know their responsibilities. All three case companies share this 
opinion, and it indicates that the control of the outsourced operations seems to be an aware 
process. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that SKF believes that control should 
also be of the supplier’s interest, and that the control is considered to be of higher importance 
in outsourcing than in an internal department. This in turn is supported by company Y’s point 
that there must be control in order for the parties to know their responsibilities, which means 
that company Y is in need of having its own control. SKF argues that a high level of control 
of the outsourced operations and the related relationship is associated with the level of trust, 
the need for control will increase the lower the level of trust is. This is not explicitly mention 
in the outsourcing literature, and is therefore seen as interesting.  
Empirical evidence indicates risks of having an excessive control, which are not addressed in 
the outsourcing literature. A company who outsource will make a mistake if the company 
commands how a supplier should do the work. Such a situation creates a risk that the original 
motives for outsourcing may not be fulfilled, and it will create inefficiency if too many 
resources are spent on performing the control. Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that 
the largest risk of having an inadequate control is that expectations may not be met since 
orders and specifications may be weak in the absence of control. An inadequate control 
provides the risk of losing control over the process, which is interpreted as a major risk since 
outsourcing is based on a process between two parties. 
Identify the management control pattern 
As both SKF and the parties mean that there is a continuous evaluation support the good 
contact and communication of knowledge sharing as discussed. In relation to company X, the 
evaluation is considered to have a high degree of measurability since service levels and 
quality can be measured in service level agreements. On the other hand, there is a low 
measurability in the relationship between SKF and company Y. That SKF in its evaluation are 
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using service level agreements to measure service and quality interprets the evaluation to be a 
part of the control of the outsourced operations. 
Since it has been found that there is a need of control, the characteristics of the control can be 
discussed, as well as what characterises transactions and the importance of trust. This in order 
to apply the outsourced operations pointed out, there is a high measurability in the 
relationship between SKF and company X, which is in accordance with the bureaucratic 
based pattern but also with the market based pattern. Since the bureaucratic based pattern 
includes detailed contracts consisting of performance targets (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 
2003), further characteristics are consistent with the empirical evidence. Despite a mainly 
consistent with the bureaucratic based pattern, the low measurability in the relationship 
between SKF and company Y can be linked to the trust based pattern. The fact that it still is 
space for interpretation though diverges from the bureaucratic based pattern, but this may not 
be able to apply on the other two patterns anyhow, as these are characterised of non-detailed 
contracts. Furthermore, the fact that the outsourced operations consist of both standardised 
and customised services indicates a low to medium repetition of transactions, and can be 
applied on the bureaucratic based pattern. As the contact and communication of knowledge 
sharing is regular, it indicates a relatively high level information exchange and 
communication of knowledge sharing, which on the other hand is applicable to the trust based 
pattern. However, there are more indications of characteristics that are in line with the 
bureaucratic based pattern, including the empirical evidence that the future market for IT 
outsourcing is perceive as stable and that the parties has a high level of competence. The 
contractual trust and competence trust has shown to be important in the outsourced operation, 
which further is a link to the bureaucratic based pattern. To conclude, the control and 
characteristics indicates overall an applicable to the bureaucratic based pattern. 
Which party has the responsibility and control? 
The collaboration between SKF and company X, as well as between SKF and company Y, 
has created a high degree of contractual trust regarding fulfilling the agreement (Langfield-
Smith & Smith, 2003). However, it exists different opinions about which of the parties that 
has the responsibility and control of the outsourced operations in the relationship. Regarding 
the shared opinion, within SKF, that SKF has the responsibility and control may be a result of 
fear of losing control. Piachaud (2005) and Rognes (2008) argue that it can be a risk if the 
outsourcing company hand over all the responsibilities to the supplier, since this supplier than 
will manage the outsourcing relationship. One of the arguments of SKF having the most 
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responsibility and control is to make sure progressing. A partnership should though be an 
equal shared collaboration with a mutual maturity. In the case of the conflicting opinions, 
between SKF and company X, regarding these issues, both parties think that they have the 
most responsibility and control. This may be a result of the perception of company X as a 
supplier. As pointed out before, company Y has the perception of being a partner and they 
also think that the responsibility and control of the outsourced operations is shared with SKF.   
Since it is about an outsourcing agreement justified by the supplier being better able to 
manage the operation, the suppliers should have the overall responsibility and control 
regarding the implementation of the operation. Meanwhile SKF, as the motivating part to the 
relation, should have more responsibility and control over the contract and the overall 
relationship. It can also be seen that SKF tries to stay in control through the contracts. The 
current contract with company X is more detailed than previous and provides, according to 
SKF, better security and stability in the relationship. 
It can be implied that contracts affect relationships 
Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003) point out the difficulty in creating detailed contracts in  
an outsourcing relationship as associated with risks and uncertain situations. SKF’s contracts 
with company X, and company Y, on the other hand are described as very detailed. This 
indicates maturity in the relationship with company X and company Y, since the outsourcing 
has been going on during several years. However, the contracts are perceived as good 
frameworks with room for reasonable interpretation. Kern and Willcocks (2000) argue 
furthermore that there is a need for a contract to manage interactions in an ongoing 
relationship. The contracts affect the relationships (Kern & Willcocks, 2000), however, the 
companies think they provide good support although the relationships to large extent is a 
collaboration. Both company X and company Y think the demands and expectations are clear 
described in the contract, but not how the services will be delivered. It is up to the suppliers to 
decide how, and it is important for the relationships that it stays like this. 
It is stated that it is difficult to change partner due to the fact that the competence is tied to 
individuals. Nevertheless both company X and company Y say that they strive to standardise 
a lot of services. This raises the question whether the contracts that SKF signs in that case will 
be shorter, because with more standardise services it is easier to change supplier. 
Furthermore, the relationships will be tested with the partners, if SKF has the opportunity to 
have more and shorter contracts will the agreements with company X and company Y maybe 
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not be viewed as partnerships. In this situation will it be clear if the agreements really are built 
on partnerships or on client-supplier relations. This do not mean that only customised services 
requires a partnership, but customisation needs more collaboration than standardised, which is 
more associated with a partnership than a client-supplier relation. 
The importance of trust in various contexts 
Finally, all empirical evidence indicates that trust is very important in an outsourcing 
relationship, which consistently can be seen in the discussion. SKF’s opinion that trust is 
created between people and with good cooperation can be linked to Kern and Willcocks 
(2000) argument that trust develops as the experience of each other develops. SKF explains 
trust as contractual as well as trust to competence, responsibility, and that people may feel 
responsible. This proves what Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003) consider being three 
different definitions of trust to manage outsourcing, the contractual trust, the competence 
trust, and the goodwill trust. It can be concluded that SKF is experiencing a trust to 
accomplish what is contracted, and that SKF has faith in its partners to have the knowledge 
and competence to fulfil what has been agreed, and that there is a trust to have responsibility, 
dependency and integrity. In contrast, company X feel that the existing trust in the 
relationship with SKF is mostly contractual, which interprets a relation to company X 
thoughts that they only are a supplier with a relationship being mostly contractual. On the 
other hand, company Y indicates like SKF that the trust is by all three definitions, probably 
because the company view themselves as partner in a partnership. 
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7. Conclusion 
This section outlines conclusions of how IT outsourcing can be managed in terms of control 
and relationships. The conclusions are drawn upon the empirical findings, and the discussion. 
In the end of this section, contributions are presented, followed by recommendations for 
further studies within the research area are suggested. 
The intended purpose with this thesis was to explore how IT outsourcing can be managed in 
order to enhance an understanding of how a company manages control and relationships with 
companies providing operations. Thus, empirical material of SKF, company X, and company 
Y has been collected, and discussed within the context of control and relationships. 
It can be concluded that a company, such as the case company SKF, can manage its IT 
outsourcing in terms of control, through the contracts with its suppliers. A well-designed, and 
detailed contract is a support to rely on, and can be used in order to control outsourced 
operations. To have control by a regular contact, and by conducting evaluations, control has 
further appeared to be an approach in order to manage outsourcing agreements. Based on this 
study, within an outsourcing agreement it can be concluded that the company who outsources 
its IT operation controls and manages what is delivered and performed. While the company 
who provides the IT outsourcing controls and manages how the operations are delivered and 
performed. Thus, the existence of a mutual control within an outsourcing agreement can be 
concluded. Controls are further needed in the sense of measure whether expectations are met, 
and so that each party can know its responsibilities. Furthermore, it can be concluded that 
having an excessive level of control creates the risk of not fulfilled initial motives to 
outsource. Since the company who outsource risks to make a mistake, if this company 
commands how a supplier should perform and deliver the outsourced operation. It has also 
appeared to be risky if the level of control is inadequate. Within this, it can be concluded that 
one of the largest risks is that expectations may not be fully met, since orders and 
specifications are liable to be weak in the absence of control. Another risk of an inadequate 
level of control is further concluded, the risk of losing control over the outsourcing process 
and the outsourced operations.  
From this case study it can be concluded that within IT outsourcing it is a large need for a 
relationship. To have a relationship is essential since an outsourcing agreement has two 
parties. It appears that there is a need for a relationship in order for each party to know their 
responsibilities. The IT outsourcing is also managed through informal contact, and informal 
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communication of knowledge sharing, thus IT outsourcing is managed through relationships. 
It can also be concluded that the informal contact is an approach to control the relationship. In 
the management of IT outsourcing, it can by this study be concluded that there are risks of 
having a very close relationship, viewed from the perspective of a company who outsources. 
The risk appears if the relationship becomes very close in the sense of not making 
evaluations, a limited room for interpretation, and loss in efficiency. It can from a supplier 
perspective be concluded that having a very close relationship only provides risks if the 
relationship is very close in the sense of very controlling. On the other hand, a loose 
relationship can result in lost control and lack in collaboration. Based on the previous, and as 
a relationship is needed, companies should find a balance within the relationship, in order to 
minimize these risks. 
It can further be concluded that IT outsourcing can be managed through trust, as trust can be 
created by cooperation, which has appeared to be important in an outsourcing agreement. 
Furthermore, since trust can be of both contractual, competences, and responsibilities, trust is 
integrated into both an outsourcing agreement, and an outsourcing relationship. 
The existence of cohesion between the management of control, and the management of 
relationships can be concluded, since this case study provides empirical evidence that the 
need of control increases or decreases depending on the relationship. Furthermore, as the 
contract is used as an approach to manage control of IT outsourcing, it has also appeared that 
this control is related with the outsourcing relationship. Because poorly defined contracts 
demonstrates how important the need for a relationship is. It has further by this study been 
seen that a high level of control of the outsourced operations and the related relationship is 
associated with the level of trust. It appears that the need for control will increase as lower the 
level of trust is. Finally, it can thus be concluded that the needed control and relationship in 
order to manage IT outsourcing also has cohesion with trust. 
Contribution 
The matrix below shows four different situations of how a company manages the IT 
outsourced operations, in terms of relationship and control. Since the thesis concludes 
cohesion between relationship and control, the IT outsourcing can be managed by having 
different combinations of these two factors. Even though it exists cohesion between 
relationship and control, in such a way that they can compensate each other, it should be kept 
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in mind that there is an uncertainty with IT outsourcing since the operation is not performed 
within the company. 
Figure 4: A company’s management of IT outsourcing, developed by Darrell and Hallersbo 
(2012). 
 
I. If a company attempts to manage its IT outsourcing in this situation, a high level of 
relationship in combination with a high level of control, the risk is that this creates 
dependency in the IT outsourcing. Since this combination of relationship and control can 
result in that the company makes the mistake of command how the outsourced operation 
should be performed and delivered. 
II. A company can manage its IT outsourcing by having a high level of relationship in 
combination with a low level of control. The thesis has concluded that a high level of 
relationship implies a high level of trust and cooperation, which compensate the low level of 
control. Thus, the IT outsourcing can be managed with this combination. 
III. If a company attempts to manage its IT outsourcing in this situation, a low level of 
relationship in combination with a low level of control, the risk is that the company loses the 
management of the outsourced operation. Since neither corporation, trust nor control exists, 
the two factors relationship and control cannot compensate each other. 
IV. A company can manage its IT outsourcing by having a low level of relationship in 
combination with a high level of control. If there is a low level of relationship, the 
cooperation is not as good as in comparison to a high level of relationship, and the level of 
trust is lower. The thesis has concluded that in this situation the level of control needs to be 
higher by performing more measurements, in order to compensate the low level of 
relationship. Thus, the IT outsourcing can be managed with this combination. 
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It can from the matrix be concluded that IT outsourcing is recommended to be managed with 
a high level of relationship combined with a low level of control, or with a low level of 
relationship combined with a high level of control. At the same time, the most important is to 
have a balance between relationship and control.  
SKF’s management of IT outsourcing 
Based on the empirical result can it be concluded that SKF has a high level of relationship, 
and a medium to high level of control towards its suppliers in order to manage the IT 
outsourcing. 
 
Recommendations for Further Studies 
A recommendation for further study is to develop this study by additional empirical 
investigations, in order to increase the validity of the research area, since three case 
companies limit this study. Within service outsourcing is a further recommendation to study 
the overall informal contact in a relationship, this in a comparison of standardised and 
customised services, since this study indicates the importance of an informal relationship. 
This study further indicates that trust has cohesion with both management of control and 
relationships within an outsourcing agreement. According to this cohesion, another 
recommendation is to further study the importance of trust in management of control and 
relationships, within an outsourcing agreement. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Figures 
Figure 1: Maturity model for IT outsourcing (Gottschalk & Solli-Sæther, 2006, p.205)
 
Figure 2: Characteristics of each stage of maturity of IT outsourcing relationships (After 
Gottschalk & Solli-Sæther, 2006, p.206) 
 
Benchmark variables Stage I Cost stage Stage II Resource stage Stage III Partnership 
stage 
BMK1: economic 
benefits 
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Figure 3: Theory concerning IT outsourcing (After Tömmervik, 2012) 
 
1. The company’s internal expected level of service before outsourcing is implemented. 
Since one of the initial purposes of outsourcing is cost savings, the level of service 
depend on the number people of working within the outsourced operations, in this case 
600 people 
2. The company face some sort of crisis. To reduce the costs is outsourcing discussed, 
and it is decided that outsourcing will be implemented. 
3. The outsourcing begins and takes effect. At the supplier, in this case 400 people work 
with the outsourced operations. The company who outsources receives a level of 
service as reflected by 400 people, and it will cost X. 
4. The company reaches the same result level as a year earlier. Though, the company’s 
internal expectations of service can be in conflict with the actual level of service. In 
order to meet the internal expected service levels should more people be included, but 
the board do not want this, because this would increase the costs and the initial reason 
for outsourcing is lost. In such situation, the outsourcing can result in a failure, since 
this situation creates a conflict between cost savings and service levels. 
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Appendix B: Information about SKF 
History and Organisation 
The founder of SKF, Svenska Kullagerfabriken (Swedish ball bearing factory) was a Swedish 
maintenance engineer named Sven Wingqvist. He worked at a textile company in Gothenburg 
where he frequently had to repair bearings due to the unstable foundation of the factory. He 
created in 1907 the world’s first self-aligning ball bearing as the solution, in the same year 
SKF was founded. After the first year SKF had 15 employees, and had produced 2200 
bearings. Despite the modest beginning the company grew quickly into a global company. 
Through own production units, authorised dealers or sales offices SKF is today represented in 
almost every country around the world. SKF Group has more than 40 000 employees, of 
which 3500 works in Sweden. The headquarter is located in Gothenburg, Sweden. In 2007 
celebrated SKF 100th anniversary and had in 2011 a turnover of around 66,216 million 
(SEK). “SKF Group is a leading global supplier of bearings, seals, mechatronics, lubrication 
systems and services which include technical support, maintenance and reliability services, 
engineering consulting and training” (SKF webpage, 2012). (SKF webpage, 2012)   
SKF group is divided into three divisions. Industrial Market and Strategic Industries is one 
division, Industrial Market, Regional Sales and Service another. Both these two business 
areas serve industrial original equipment manufacturers. The last division is Automotive, 
which serve automotive original equipment manufacturers. All three divisions also serve 
aftermarket customers. The business areas serve on a global market consisting of about 40 
customer segments, for example cars and light trucks, wind energy, railway, machine tool and 
paper industries. Technical knowledge and skills is collected in five technology platforms, 
Bearings and units, Seals, Mechatronics, Services, and Lubrication Systems. Customised 
offers for each customer segment can thus be made by combining skills from all the 
platforms. By working in this way will the customers to SKF improve their performance, 
reduce energy use and lower total costs. Technical development, quality and marketing have 
always been important areas. Investment in development and research has led to several 
innovations, which have established new standards, products, and solutions in the industry. 
SKF describes itself as a knowledge engineering company. The vision “To equip the world 
with SKF knowledge” (SKF webpage, 2012) means using over one hundred years knowledge 
of the business to develop and deliver products, services, and solutions that contributes to 
customers success. (SKF webpage, 2012)  
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Appendix C: Interview Guides 
Interview Guide – SKF 
The questions refer to outsourcing merely as outsourcing of IT. 
Interview Person 
Position 
Responsibilities 
Motives for IT Outsourcing 
1. What does SKF have as motives for IT outsourcing, and why has SKF chosen to outsource 
such a large part of its IT operations? 
 What part of the IT operation has been retained within the company? 
2. According to you, what are the benefits of outsourcing? 
 Is the future market for IT outsourcing predictable or uncertain? 
3. According to you, what are the risks and disadvantages of outsourcing? 
4. Is the primary motivation of outsourcing cost savings or is it strategically justified? 
5. Is IT a core competence for SKF? 
 What kind of value has IT for SKF? 
Partners 
6. How many outsourcing partners has SKF within IT? 
7. How does SKF proceed in selecting an outsourcing partner? 
8. Why was company X/company Y selected as an outsourcing partner? 
9. What is outsourced to company X/company Y? 
 How much of the total outsourcing goes to company X/company Y? 
10. How long has SKF outsourced to company X/company Y? 
Relationships and Control 
11. What type of contact does SKF generally have with company X/company Y? 
 Formal 
 Informal 
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12. Is the relationship between SKF and company X/company Y viewed as contractual or as a 
collaboration? 
13. How does the communication of knowledge sharing work between SKF and company 
X/company Y? 
14. In the relationship between SKF and company X/company Y, which party has the 
responsibility and control of the outsourced operation? 
15. What is included in a contract with an outsourcing partner and how is it designed? 
16. According to you, what is the need of a relationship in an outsourcing agreement? 
17. According to you, what is the risk of having a too strong or too weak relationship with a 
partner? 
18. Do you experience that SKF in its relationship with company X/company Y has achieved 
financial gain through cost reduction, access to external resources and partnership with 
mutual goals? 
 If so, how and why? 
19. How are the relationships evaluated? 
 To what extent is the work in the outsourced operation measurable? 
20. Is the control of the outsourced operation to company X/company Y and its relationships 
most of a formal or informal control? 
21. To what extent is trust important in the outsourcing relationship between SKF and 
company X/company Y? 
22. Are the parties in outsourcing relationship allowed to take advantage of the other 
company’s assets? 
23. According to you, what is the need of control in an outsourcing agreement? 
24. According to you, what is the risk of having too much or too little control of the 
outsourced operation and its related relationship? 
25. Has the relationship with company X/company Y changed over time? 
 
    Appendices 
VI 
 
26. Have there been any problems, conflicts or misunderstandings with company X/company 
Y? 
27. Has the outsourcing affected SKFs success? 
 Contributed to competitive advantage? 
28. Has the outsourcing satisfied the expectations? 
Interview Guide – Suppliers 
The questions refer to outsourcing merely as outsourcing of IT. 
Interview Person 
Position 
Responsibilities 
IT Outsourcing in General 
1. According to you, what are the benefits of outsourcing? 
 Is the future market for IT outsourcing predictable or uncertain? 
 How is the competition perceived?  
2. According to you, what are the risks and disadvantages of outsourcing? 
3. How many outsourcing customers within IT has company X/company Y? 
Outsourcing Agreement between Company X/Company Y and SKF 
4. Has company X/company Y offered its services or was it SKF who requested them? 
5. How much of company X’s/company Y’s IT operation is performed to SKF? 
6. What kind of operations does company X/company Y provide to SKF? 
Relationships and Control 
7. What type of contact does company X/company Y generally have with SKF? 
 Formal 
 Informal 
8. Is the relationship between company X/company Y and SKF viewed as contractual or as a 
collaboration? 
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9. Do you experience that SKF only sees company X/company Y as a supplier or even as a 
partner? 
10. How does the communication of knowledge sharing work between company X/company 
Y and SKF? 
11. In the relationship between company X/company Y and SKF, which party has the 
responsibility and control of the outsourced operation? 
12. What is included in the outsourcing contract with SKF and how is it designed? 
13. Are the services that company X/company Y offers standardised or are they customised? 
14. According to you, what is the need of a relationship in an outsourcing agreement? 
15. According to you, what is the risk of having a too strong or too weak relationship with a 
partner? 
16. Do you experience that SKF has achieved financial gain through cost reduction, access to 
external resources and partnership with mutual goals by outsourcing to company X/company 
Y? 
 If so, how and why? 
17. How are the relationships evaluated? 
 To what extent is the work in the outsourced operation measurable?  
18. To what extent is trust important in the outsourcing relationship between company 
X/company Y and SKF? 
19. Are the parties in outsourcing relationship allowed to take advantage of the other 
company’s assets? 
20. According to you, what is the need of control in an outsourcing agreement? 
21. According to you, what is the risk of having too much or too little control of the 
outsourced operation and its related relationship? 
22. Has the relationship with SKF changed over time? 
23. Have there been any problems, conflicts or misunderstandings with SKF? 
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24. Do you think that the outsourcing to company X/company Y has provided SKF success 
and competitive advantage? 
 If so, how and why? 
25. To what extent is SKF’s success and growth reflected within company X/company Y? 
 Can company X/company Y achieve success and growth through SKF? 
